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TRUST THE PROCESS: UNDERSTANDING 
PROCEDURAL STANDING UNDER SPOKEO 
JON ROMBERG 
Abstract 
In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Supreme Court issued its first meaningful 
decision in nearly twenty-five years addressing procedural standing—the 
question of when violation of a statutory, procedural right presents the 
injury-in-fact required for standing under Article III. The opaque decision 
settled little, raising many important questions and leaving numerous 
circuit splits and enduring confusion on matters of compelling importance 
in its wake. 
Procedural standing is a significant front in the Court’s nascent 
separation-of-powers revolution that was fueled by the appointments of 
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh and the retirement of Justice Kennedy, 
who had been the fulcrum of the Court’s prior procedural standing 
jurisprudence. Procedural standing will shape Congress’s power to enact 
statutes that protect consumers’ rights to informational privacy in cases 
involving data breaches and biometric hacks. 
The Article proposes a comprehensive scheme for understanding 
procedural standing under Spokeo and the concrete injury-in-fact it 
requires. The key is recognizing that Congress enacts statutory, procedural 
rights for multiple, distinct reasons, and that each category corresponds to 
a different set of rules for assessing the existence of procedural standing. 
There are two broad categories of procedural rights. First, there are 
intrinsically injurious rights, the violation of which itself constitutes injury-
in-fact. Second, there are instrumental rights—newly brought into the 
procedural standing universe by Spokeo—the violation of which does not 
itself impose real-world harm. Congress enacts instrumental rights to 
prevent some other concrete, real-world injury. For one sub-type of 
instrumental rights, instrumental automatically injurious rights, Congress 
has concluded that violation of the statutory right is sufficient for standing 
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even without additional evidence of concrete injury; for another sub-type, 
instrumental presumptively injurious rights, additional evidence is 
required. The judiciary should defer to these congressional judgments in 
assessing procedural standing. 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ............................................................................................... 519 
I. Procedural Standing Under Spokeo ....................................................... 531 
A. Spokeo’s Explication of Procedural Standing .................................. 531 
1. The Claims in Spokeo ................................................................... 531 
2. Spokeo’s Superficial Holding: Procedural Standing Requires 
Injury-in-Fact that Is Not Only Particularized but Also Concrete ... 532 
3. Procedural Standing Prior to Spokeo: Bare Procedural Enforcement 
Rights over Agency Decision-Making Don’t Confer Standing ....... 534 
4. Spokeo’s Opaque Recapitulation of the Established 
Principles of Procedural Standing .................................................... 539 
B. Spokeo’s Embrace of the Role of History and the Role 
of Congress ........................................................................................... 543 
1. History .......................................................................................... 543 
2. Congress ....................................................................................... 544 
C. Spokeo’s Confounding Examples of No Material Risk of Concrete 
Harm ..................................................................................................... 546 
1. Defective Notice to Users When a Credit Report Contains 
No Inaccuracies ................................................................................ 547 
2. An Incorrect Zip Code .................................................................. 549 
D. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence ........................................................ 552 
II. Judicial Turbulence in Spokeo’s Wake ................................................ 553 
A. The Supreme Court’s Recent Intimations About Procedural 
Standing ................................................................................................ 553 
B. Confusion in the Courts of Appeals ................................................. 560 
1. Collecting, Retaining, and Failing to Secure Information ............ 561 
2. The Obligation to Notify Consumers that Disputes Must 
Be in Writing .................................................................................... 565 
3. Disclosing Excessive Information on a Credit Card 
Receipt .............................................................................................. 566 
4. Notice About the Identity of a Creditor ........................................ 567 
5. Recording the Satisfaction of a Mortgage .................................... 568 
6. The Obligation to Provide Job Applicants a Credit Report Before 
Taking Adverse Action .................................................................... 568 
III. Understanding Procedural Standing Under Spokeo ............................ 569 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/2
2020]       PROCEDURAL STANDING UNDER SPOKEO 519 
 
 
A. Spokeo Introduces a Third Strand of Procedural Standing: 
Instrumental Rights Against Private Defendants .................................. 570 
B. Congress Enacts Procedural Rights for Multiple, Distinct Reasons 
Corresponding to Multiple, Distinct Categories of Procedural 
Standing ................................................................................................ 573 
C. Judicial Deference to Congressional Judgment ............................... 574 
IV. The Categories of Statutory, Procedural Rights ................................. 576 
A. Enforcement Rights ......................................................................... 578 
B. Intrinsically Injurious Rights ........................................................... 579 
1. Intrinsically Injurious Intangible Rights ....................................... 579 
2. Intrinsically Injurious Decision-Making and Dignitary 
Rights ............................................................................................... 582 
C. Instrumental Procedural Rights ........................................................ 588 
1. Instrumental Automatically Injurious Rights ............................... 588 
2. Instrumental Presumptively Injurious Rights ............................... 591 
D. Substance Versus Procedure Is Not a Meaningful Categorical 
Distinction ............................................................................................ 592 
V. Spokeo’s Answers, and Answers to Spokeo’s Questions ..................... 594 
VI. Problem Cases Revisited .................................................................... 597 
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 600 
Introduction 
In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,1 the Supreme Court accurately—and 
unintelligibly—summarized the principles of procedural standing it had 
developed over the prior twenty-five years. Procedural standing presents the 
question of whether federal courts have jurisdiction to address claimed 
violations of a statutory, procedural right under Article III—in particular, 
whether the violation of such a right presents the concrete injury-in-fact 
required for standing.2 As Spokeo explained: 
[T]he violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be 
sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. In 
other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 
(1992) (holding “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” imposed by the “case-
or-controversy requirement of Article III” is “injury in fact” that is both “concrete and 
particularized” and “actual or imminent”; “a causal connection between the injury” and the 
defendant’s conduct; and proof that the injury is “redress[able] by a favorable decision”) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified. . . . On 
the other hand, [a plaintiff] cannot satisfy the demands of Article 
III by alleging a bare procedural violation.3 
Spokeo thus recognizes that in “some circumstances” involving a “risk of 
real harm,” violation of a statutory, procedural right automatically presents 
the concrete injury-in-fact necessary for standing; there is no need to 
“allege any additional harm” beyond the procedural violation itself.4 But 
how are those circumstances to be determined? In contrast, Spokeo also 
recognizes that a “bare” procedural violation is never sufficient to produce 
the injury-in-fact required by Article III.5 But which procedural violations 
are bare? 
Moreover, those are apparently not the only possibilities: The cupboard 
is not always full or bare such that violation of a statutory, procedural right 
either always or never satisfies Article III. Instead, a third set of 
circumstances exists in which violation of the procedural right sometimes 
presents a case or controversy depending on the additional harm or risk of 
harm beyond the procedural violation itself.6 But what role does the risk of 
real harm play in such cases, and how is to be measured? Does that 
determination turn on the risk of harm to the particular plaintiff? Or does it 
turn on Congress’s judgment about the likelihood of risk to the class of 
people protected by a statutory, procedural right that generally arises from 
violation of that right?7 Spokeo provides no clear answer to any of these 
questions. 
Moreover, without acknowledging the novelty of its approach, Spokeo 
applies procedural standing principles to a different context than the Court’s 
prior procedural standing decisions. In previous cases, two statutory, 
procedural concerns placed the decision within the procedural standing 
rubric.8 First, Congress had imposed a procedural decision-making 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50. 
 4. Id. at 1549. 
 5. Id. at 1549–50. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8 (explaining “that an individual can[] enforce procedural 
rights[] . . . so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened 
concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing”). 
 8. Procedural standing is also sometimes referred to as statutory standing, or intangible 
standing. Both Lujan and (with somewhat less obvious justification) Spokeo refer to 
procedural rights as the unifying concept, but the procedural rights at issue are also statutory 
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obligation on an administrative agency, constraining whether the agency 
was obligated to make a particular decision and how the agency was to 
make that decision, without constraining what substantive decision the 
agency would ultimately make.9 Second, Congress had granted a procedural 
enforcement right—a cause of action—that purportedly authorized anyone 
to bring suit challenging the agency’s failure to comply with its decision-
making obligation.10 
In these prior procedural standing cases, the Court required that plaintiffs 
demonstrate a particularized interest in the subject matter of the agency’s 
decision. The Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce the 
procedural decision-making right as against the agency in the absence of 
such a particularized interest, notwithstanding Congress’s grant of a “bare” 
procedural enforcement right purporting to authorize anyone to bring suit, 
regardless of any particularized interest in the outcome of the agency’s 
decision.11 In environmental cases, for example, plaintiffs are required to 
demonstrate geographic proximity to the area the agency allegedly 
endangered by violation of its decision-making obligation.12 However, so 
long as plaintiffs have a particularized interest in the subject matter of the 
agency’s decision, they need not demonstrate that violation of the decision-
making obligation caused any further harm or risk of harm beyond the 
denial of that procedural decision-making right itself.13 In other words, the 
Court held that plaintiffs need not show that the agency’s failure to comply 
                                                                                                                 
and intangible, and the label is of course of little relevance. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549; 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 9. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009); Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see also William Baude, 
Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 204–09; Christopher T. Burt, 
Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 
282–86 (1995). 
 10. See, e.g., Summers, 555 U.S. at 497; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517–18; 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8; see also Baude, supra note 9, at 204–09; Burt, supra note 9, at 
282–86. 
 11. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–78. 
 12. See id. at 562–67; see also Summers, 555 U.S. at 497. 
 13. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (“The person who has been accorded a procedural right 
to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards 
for redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site 
for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing 
agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot 
establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or 
altered, and even though the dam will not be completed for many years.”). 
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with the mandated procedure caused or risked causing them any additional, 
real-world harm.14 
Spokeo, in contrast, involved neither a statutory decision-making process 
imposed on an administrative agency nor a general grant of a “bare” 
procedural enforcement right in any person. Instead, it involved a statute 
that granted specific rights to particular individuals, as against a private 
defendant, and afforded a right to sue to plaintiffs whose particularized 
rights have been violated.15 So what does Spokeo mean when it pours the 
new wine of particularized rights against private parties into old procedural 
standing bottles—what new type of statutory right does Spokeo characterize 
as procedural and thus subject to procedural standing principles, despite the 
sharply varying implications for separation of powers for statutes directed 
against private parties as opposed to those constraining agency decision-
making?16 Procedural standing is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside the 
enigma that is Article III standing.17  
                                                                                                                 
 14. Id. 
 15. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545–46, 1548, 1550 (2016) (remanding to 
the Ninth Circuit for further consideration of the existence of concrete injury in fact); Robins 
v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that Robins’ alleged injury 
was both particularized and concrete). 
 16. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (“[T]he law of Art[icle] III standing is 
built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”); see also Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 
at 1550–51 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that separation of powers has little 
applicability to suits against private parties); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and 
Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 61 (2012) (explaining that, unlike in Lujan, in suits asserting 
individualized procedural rights as against private parties, “the separation of powers concern 
[i]s entirely absent, since the plaintiff [i]s not part of an ‘undifferentiated public,’ nor [i]s the 
executive branch the target of the lawsuit”). 
 17. This Article accepts as a given the Supreme Court’s conclusions—questionable as 
they may be—about the requirement of concrete injury-in-fact for standing, and for 
procedural standing in particular. Instead, this Article aims to provide a coherent account of 
procedural standing that both makes sense, and that makes sense of the Court’s procedural 
standing jurisprudence, including that in Spokeo. 
As to standing, many scholars have convincingly argued that the Court’s newfound 
insistence on concrete injury, beginning in the 1970s, is historically unfounded, not required 
or suggested by the text of Article III, and not even a good proxy for when a litigant has the 
incentive, capacity, and interest to be an effective advocate. The requirement of injury-in-
fact under Article III is open to serious question and has been repeatedly and powerfully 
challenged by academics. See, e.g., Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative 
Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 450–56 (1974); 
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988) (“If such a 
 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/2
2020]       PROCEDURAL STANDING UNDER SPOKEO 523 
 
 
Part I of this Article explores Spokeo on its own terms. On the one hand, 
as Spokeo suggests, standing predicated on a procedural violation is in some 
ways more difficult to demonstrate than standing in other contexts because 
procedural standing faces the additional hurdle of demonstrating that denial 
of an intangible, procedural right has resulted in concrete injury. 
On the other hand, procedural standing is in some ways less difficult to 
satisfy than other forms of standing. Lujan set forth the “irreducible 
constitutional minimum of standing” to require injury that is “redressable” 
and either “actual” or “imminent.”18 But in an enigmatic footnote, Lujan 
qualified that principle in the context of procedural standing, explaining 
that “[t]he person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his 
concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal 
                                                                                                                 
requirement of injury is a constitutional minimum that Congress cannot remove by statute, 
the Court is either insisting on something that can have no meaning beyond a requirement 
that plaintiff be truthful about the injury she is claiming to suffer, or the Court is sub silentio 
inserting into its ostensibly factual requirement of injury a normative structure of what 
constitutes judicially cognizable injury that Congress is forbidden to change.”); Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on 
Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1170–71 (1993) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s opinion 
“is an insupportable judicial contraction of the legislative power to make judicially 
enforceable policy decisions”); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen 
Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 217 (1992) (“Scalia reads Article III 
broadly, invests it with general, controversial values, and ultimately recommends judicial 
invalidation of the outcomes of democratic processes.”) [hereinafter Sunstein, What’s 
Standing]. See generally Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How 
Criminal Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the 
Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2245 (1999) (comparing the “injury-in-fact” 
requirements with Article III criminal standing requirements) (“Despite its apparent 
reasonableness under current Supreme Court doctrine, I submit that no federal judge, if 
pressed, would seriously contend that Article III requires that the United States must suffer 
an injury in fact that is ‘personal,’ ‘concrete and particularized,’ and ‘actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical’ before litigation on its behalf can be brought in federal court.”). 
Because the Court shows no inclination whatsoever to retreat from its approach to standing, 
this Article takes the Court’s basic principles, including concrete injury-in-fact, as a given.  
As to procedural standing, other than Justice Thomas, every member of the Court in 
Spokeo, including the four liberal justices who might have been thought to take a more 
latitudinarian approach to procedural standing, rejected Justice Thomas’s sensible embrace 
of a sharp distinction between careful scrutiny of claims brought against public entities and 
minimal requirements for procedural standing as against private entities. See infra Section 
I.D. Whatever the merits of the Court’s rejecting such possibilities in Spokeo, the possibility 
of revisiting those decisions seems vanishingly small, and thus the propriety of doing so is 
largely beyond the scope of this Article. 
 18. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
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standards for redressability and immediacy.”19 In other words, the 
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing is reduced in the procedural 
standing context. But how can these principles of procedural standing be 
harmonized, if at all? As Professor William Baude has observed, standing 
for statutory, procedural rights is “one of the hardest questions in modern 
federal courts doctrine.”20 
Spokeo points to the important role of history and of congressional 
judgment in assessing procedural standing, as explained in Section I.B, but 
provides little in the way of clarity.21 It does not answer whether a historical 
analog to the procedural right at issue is necessary or simply sufficient for 
standing. Spokeo is similarly opaque about the role congressional judgment 
plays in assessing procedural standing.22  
The Court has been unclear and contradictory regarding whether 
Congress can enact a statute that confers procedural standing that would 
otherwise not exist. It has stated, on the one hand, that “Congress may 
create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can 
confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no 
judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute.”23 In such cases, 
“[t]he actual or threatened injury required by Art[icle] III may exist solely 
by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates 
standing . . . .’”24 On the other hand, “[i]t is settled that Congress cannot 
erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to 
sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”25  
Spokeo attempts to square these non-overlapping circles in the 
procedural standing context. Notably, it embraces Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Lujan, which, in addressing procedural standing, recognized 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. at 572 n.7; see also Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing 
Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 175, 185–87 (2012) (arguing that 
procedural standing is simply an incoherent anomaly that cannot be reconciled with the 
general law of standing) (“Congress has created procedural rights and made it clear that they 
can be enforced without meeting the normal injury, causation, and redressability 
requirements [of standing].”). 
 20. Baude, supra note 9, at 212. 
 21. See infra Section I.B. 
 22. See infra Section I.B.  
 23. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)). 
 24. Id. at 500 (quoting Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617 n.3). 
 25. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 
521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)). 
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that “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of 
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed 
before.”26 Spokeo cautions, however, that “Congress’ role in identifying and 
elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically 
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a 
statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that 
right.”27 The Court adopts the following, purportedly harmonizing, 
criterion: “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context 
of a statutory violation,” and concrete injury requires either actual harm or a 
“risk of real harm.”28 Thus, Spokeo concludes opaquely, Congress validly 
confers standing when denial of a procedure it mandates, though intangible, 
is concrete, and when the risk of harm resulting from that denial is real and 
not bare. 
Section I.C then addresses the two confounding examples of procedural 
injuries that Spokeo apparently suggests would not be concrete: (1) an 
incorrect zip code in a credit report and (2) defective notice to users of a 
credit report when the report contains no inaccuracies.29 Both examples are 
mistaken in ways that are not actually relevant to the Court’s reasoning and 
that distract from the Court’s intended approach to procedural standing. 
Finally, Section I.D discusses Justice Thomas’s perceptive concurrence in 
which he alone endorses a fundamental distinction between the sort of 
procedural standing at issue in the agency decision-making cases and the 
more generous approach that should apply to the private procedural rights 
at issue in Spokeo. 
In assessing procedural standing, one longs for the clarity and precision 
of Justice Stewart’s famous test for obscenity: “I know it when I see 
it . . . .”30 As the Sixth Circuit has acknowledged, “It’s difficult, we 
recognize, to identify the line between what Congress may, and may not, do 
in creating an ‘injury in fact.’ Put five smart lawyers in a room, and it won’t 
take long to appreciate the difficulty of the task at hand.”31  
Section II.A explains that procedural standing is both exceedingly 
complex and of great practical import. The scope of procedural standing, if 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
 27. Id. at 1549. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1550. 
 30. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 31. Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 2018). 
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read unduly narrowly, could sharply constrain Congress’s ability to enact 
judicially enforceable legislation that grants rights against private 
corporations.32 Procedural standing serves as a potentially oppressive 
gatekeeper in the Court’s nascent separation-of-powers revolution. 
Standing, including procedural standing, is grounded on the separation of 
powers.33 “In order to remain faithful to th[e] tripartite structure [of the 
federal government], the power of the Federal Judiciary may not be 
permitted to intrude upon the powers given to the other branches.”34 Under 
Spokeo, the judicial branch safeguards separation-of-powers, limiting its 
own power and thus preserving congressional power. But how? By 
exercising its own power to repudiate Congress’s power and refusing to 
enforce the procedural rights that Congress has enacted with the express 
purpose of judicial enforcement.35 This act of judicial jiu-jitsu—holding 
that Article III limits the judicial power so as to preserve congressional 
power, but somehow thereby empowers the Court to limit congressional 
power—is enough to make Chief Justice Marshall blush.36 
                                                                                                                 
 32. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 17, at 233 (“For the Court to limit the power of 
Congress to create statutory rights enforceable by certain groups of people—to limit, in other 
words, the power of Congress to create standing—is to limit the power of Congress to define 
and protect against certain kinds of injury that the Court thinks it improper to protect 
against.”); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 275, 320–21 (2008) (“The Constitution charges Congress with enacting laws. The 
injury-in-fact requirement, however, restricts Congress’s power to create rights . . . thus 
prevent[ing] Congress from exercising the full extent of its power to create rights that private 
individuals may seek to vindicate in the courts.”). 
 33. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (“[T]he law of Art[icle] III standing is 
built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”). 
 34. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. 
 35. See Daniel Solove, When Is a Person Harmed by a Privacy Violation? Thoughts on 
Spokeo v. Robins, TEACHPRIVACY (May 17, 2016), https://www.teachprivacy.com/thoughts-
on-spokeo-v-robins/ (“When Congress deems something to be a concrete injury, courts 
should respect the will of Congress. The entire reason for the concrete injury requirement is 
a separation-of-powers . . . protection of Congress against encroachment by the courts. But 
the Spokeo[] decision usurps Congress’s power, curtailing its ability to define concrete 
injury.”). As a commentator suggested of Lujan, “[t]he majority opinion . . . transposes a 
doctrine of judicial restraint into a judicially enforced doctrine of congressional restraint.” 
Pierce, supra note 17, at 1199. 
 36. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the 
Court’s power to engage in judicial review of congressional action but declining to exercise 
that power). 
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The Court, apparently emboldened by newly confirmed Justices Gorsuch 
and Kavanaugh and a newfound skepticism of procedural standing in the 
Trump administration’s Department of Justice,37 has become increasingly 
vigilant about enforcing its stringent view of the separation of powers, 
including the tightly constrained role it sees for the judiciary under Article 
III. Spokeo is thus in harmony with the Court’s other recent decisions in 
Gundy v. United States38 and Kisor v. Wilkie,39 which strongly suggest that 
the Court will soon employ separation-of-powers principles to undercut the 
power of the administrative state, looking to Article III to constrain the 
legislative and executive branches’ abilities to protect individuals from 
corporate malfeasance. 
Indeed, the Court signaled that it will continue paying close attention to 
procedural standing in 2019. In Frank v. Gaos, the Court avoided deciding 
a case on the grounds on which it had granted certiorari (the propriety of a 
cy pres class action settlement of a claim against Google).40 Instead, at the 
suggestion of the Solicitor General, the Court raised procedural standing—
an issue that none of the parties had raised—and remanded the case to the 
Ninth Circuit for consideration of whether there was concrete injury 
sufficient to support procedural standing.41 Absent procedural standing, 
judicial approval of the class settlement will be impermissible, as will any 
realistic prospect of suit against Google for the claimed violation of 
millions of class members’ statutory rights of privacy.42 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Support Respondent, Spokeo, 
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339), 2015 WL 5260469 (supporting procedural standing), 
and Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 567 U.S. 
756 (2012) (No. 10-708), 2011 WL 4957380 (supporting procedural standing), with Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 
1041 (2019) (No. 17-961), 2018 WL 3456069 (suggesting the Court remand on an issue of 
procedural standing raised by none of the parties and outside the scope of the question on 
which the Court granted certiorari). 
 38. 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
 39. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 40. 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1043–44, 1046 (2019) (per curiam). 
 41. Id. at 1043–46. 
 42. Procedural standing and the question of how much risk of harm is necessary for 
standing are also central to the Court’s upcoming decision in Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 
17-1712 (argued Jan. 13, 2020). See Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A., SCOTUSBLOG, 
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
Thole addresses a circuit split as to standing in the context of ERISA claims brought by 
beneficiaries of defined-benefit plans when defendants engaged in conduct that allegedly 
harmed the overall plan, but with little or no risk that the individual plaintiffs will be harmed 
 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
528 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:517 
 
 
As Section II.B explains, such rulings will control whether courts permit 
Congress and state legislatures to address informational and privacy 
concerns raised by the actions of technology giants such as Google and 
Facebook. On August 8, 2019, in a multi-billion dollar class claim against 
Facebook, the Ninth Circuit held that Facebook’s alleged violation of 
millions of class members’ rights under an Illinois biometric privacy statute 
constituted concrete injury that afforded procedural standing under 
Spokeo.43 Similarly, massive data breaches and exposure of biometric data 
have become commonplace, such as the recent hacking of Equifax44 and 
Capital One.45 Consumers will only be able to bring suit, and will only be 
able to receive the much-publicized $125 recovery or identity theft 
monitoring through settlements of such suits, if courts find procedural 
standing under Article III. The courts of appeals, however, are in disarray 
as to whether standing exists for plaintiffs whose private data or biometric 
information has been breached, but whose identity has not (yet) been 
stolen.46 
Similarly, the rights of educationally disabled children may also be in 
jeopardy. Such rights are almost entirely grounded on procedural 
protections that mandate the process by which a school district must create 
an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) rather than on the substantive 
appropriateness of the resulting IEP.47 Will Spokeo be read to bar suit for a 
school district’s violation of its procedural duties in creating an IEP unless 
                                                                                                                 
by that conduct. See id; Basem Besada & Brandon A. Slotkin, Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 
LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/17-1712 (last visited Jan. 31, 
2020). The question of how much individualized risk of harm is sufficient for standing in 
this context implicates the historical openness to such claims brought by trust beneficiaries, 
even absent an individualized risk of harm, and a broad approach to standing that is in 
tension with the Court’s general skepticism about standing in the absence of evidence of 
such harm. 
 43. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1268, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 44. Stacy Cowley, Equifax to Pay at Least $650 Million in Largest-Ever Data Breach 
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/business/ 
equifax-settlement.html. 
 45. Emily Flitter & Karen Weise, Capital One Data Breach Compromises Data of Over 
100 Million, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/29/business/ 
capital-one-data-breach-hacked.html. 
 46. See infra Section II.B. 
 47. See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 
(1982) (recognizing “the legislative conviction that adequate compliance with the procedures 
prescribed [as to IEP formation] would in most cases assure much if not all of what 
Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP”). 
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the child can somehow prove non-speculative, additional, concrete harm 
arising from the procedural violation?48 
Indicative of the confusion and ferment in procedural standing 
jurisprudence, Section II.B further explains that the Delphic decision in 
Spokeo has given rise to multiple circuit splits, dissents, and dissents from 
denial of rehearing en banc in the courts of appeals in the brief period since 
the decision. For example, the courts of appeals are in significant tension, 
and often outright disagreement, about whether a data breach and ensuant 
risk of identity theft are sufficient for procedural standing.49 The circuits are 
split on multiple other issues as well.50 Perhaps even more fundamentally, 
the cases have not even coalesced into different camps; the courts have yet 
to develop a coherent theory—or theories—of procedural standing. 
Part III attempts to resolve the opacity in the Supreme Court and 
confusion in the courts of appeals by setting forth such a theory. Two recent 
scholarly efforts attempting to make sense of procedural standing have 
arrived at real-world dead ends. First, Professor Baude concludes that 
Justice Thomas has the best of the argument in Spokeo by distinguishing 
between claimed statutory violations of public rights (the traditional realm 
of procedural standing) and of those against private defendants (for which 
standing should be much more readily satisfied).51 However, while this 
argument is historically compelling, no other member of the Court appears 
to agree with Thomas, so the approach is of little practical relevance. 
Second, authors Lee and Ellis analyze procedural standing in some depth, 
hoping to derive an intelligible theory; ultimately, however, they throw up 
their hands, announcing that they are unable to derive any single, coherent 
theory that places procedural standing within the realm of general principles 
of standing.52 They argue that the only way to understand procedural 
standing is simply to conclude “that the Case or Controversy Clause has 
two tiers” with completely inconsistent rules—a more forgiving tier for 
procedural standing and a stricter tier for everything else.53  
                                                                                                                 
 48. Cf. Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in Special 
Education Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415 (2011) (explicating the primacy of procedural 
protections under special education law). 
 49. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 50. See infra Sections II.B.2–5. 
 51. Baude, supra note 9, at 227–31. 
 52. Lee & Ellis, supra note 19, at 235–36. 
 53. Id. at 175 (arguing one tier applies when “Congress has created procedural rights 
and made it clear that they can be enforced without meeting the normal injury, causation, 
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This Article agrees that there is no single, coherent theory of procedural 
standing that reconciles all the incompatible principles the Court recites and 
announces in Spokeo. However, it makes the principles of procedural 
standing intelligible by arguing that Congress enacts statutory procedural 
rights that fit into multiple, distinct categories, and that a coherent set of 
principles applies within each category.  
Section III.A explains a fundamental, unrecognized development brought 
about by Spokeo: it expands procedural standing to apply to a novel, third 
strand of statutory rights that were referenced, but not actually presented, in 
Lujan. Spokeo implicitly holds that procedural standing principles apply to 
instrumental rights as against private parties, i.e., provisions that Congress 
enacts not because violation of the right is itself a real-world problem, but 
because the right is intended to protect against some distinct, concrete 
injury with which Congress is actually concerned.  
Section III.B then explores the distinct reasons that Congress enacts the 
various categories of procedural rights: enforcement rights; decision-
making rights; and, most notably, the novel category of instrumental 
statutory rights. It also assesses the legislative judgments that Congress is 
making when it enacts those various rights. Most notably, Congress enacts 
instrumental rights when it concludes that it may be difficult to prove or 
measure the existence of the concrete injury, or that the instrumental right is 
necessary and proper as a prophylactic means to help prevent occurrence of 
the concrete injury rather than merely provide compensation for its 
violation. Section III.C explains that the judiciary owes deference to such 
legislative judgments, so long as Congress is exercising its power to define 
injuries and articulate chains of causation between instrumental rights and 
the concrete injuries with which Congress is ultimately concerned. 
Part IV catalogs the various types of procedural rights at issue in 
procedural standing cases: intrinsically injurious rights and instrumental 
rights. In addition to enforcement rights, i.e., those granting a cause of 
action, Congress enacts certain statutory rights—intrinsically injurious 
rights—because it believes violation of those rights automatically 
constitutes injury-in-fact.54 Intrinsically injurious rights include intrinsically 
injurious intangible rights, which define certain intangible rights as 
inherently legally enforceable, and intrinsically injurious decision-making 
                                                                                                                 
and redressability requirements . . . and another tier [applies] for all other cases, where the 
normal requirements [of standing] apply”). 
 54. See infra Section IV.B. 
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and dignitary rights, which involve procedural rights that govern decision-
making such that the denial of the decision-making right itself constitutes 
injury, without requiring proof of additional harm by showing that the 
procedural violation affected the outcome of the decision. 
Instrumental rights also fall into two sub-types. Congress’s intent in 
enacting such a right depends on its understanding of the chain of causation 
between the instrumental right and the ultimate concrete interest at stake. 
For the first category of instrumental rights—instrumental automatically 
injurious rights—Congress intends that a violation of the statutory right 
alone automatically affords standing, without the need for additional 
evidence of concrete harm; this is so because Congress has concluded that a 
material risk of harm categorically arises from violation of the statutory 
right.55 For the second category of instrumental statutory rights—
instrumental presumptively injurious rights—Congress has concluded that 
concrete injury is likely to arise from the statutory violation, but intends for 
courts to assess whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that a material risk 
of harm to her concrete interests arose from the statutory violation.56 
Part V canvasses the issues that Spokeo resolved, and those it left open. 
It provides a concrete explanation of the best answers to the questions that 
Spokeo and the courts of appeals have left unanswered. 
Finally, Part VI applies the approach outlined above to various 
procedural standing disputes that have bedeviled the courts. While applying 
the proper approaches to procedural standing does not necessarily make 
resolution of these cases easy—at least until Congress starts explicitly 
expressing the category of instrumental right it intends to create—this 
approach vastly simplifies and clarifies the questions that must be answered 
to determine standing in cases in which plaintiffs assert procedural rights. 
I. Procedural Standing Under Spokeo 
A. Spokeo’s Explication of Procedural Standing 
1. The Claims in Spokeo 
The mundane claim in Spokeo belies its vital implications for procedural 
standing. Thomas Robins sued Spokeo, Inc. for “publish[ing] an allegedly 
inaccurate report about him on its website,” claiming “willful violations” of 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See infra Section IV.C.1. 
 56. See infra Section IV.C.2. 
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“a number of procedural requirements on consumer reporting agencies” that 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) imposes.57  
Most notably, the FCRA requires credit reporting agencies to “follow 
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of” consumer 
reports.58 The FCRA also requires that credit reporting agencies: (1) “notify 
providers and users of consumer information of their responsibilities under 
the Act;” (2) “limit the circumstances in which such agencies provide 
consumer reports ‘for employment purposes;’” and (3) “post toll-free 
numbers for consumers to request reports.”59 
Robins alleged that Spokeo’s report “states that he is married, has 
children, is in his 50’s, has a job, is relatively affluent, and holds a graduate 
degree,” but that “all of this information is incorrect,” thereby interfering 
with his job prospects and causing him emotional distress.60 In its initial 
decision, the Ninth Circuit held that Robins had standing because “he 
allege[d] that Spokeo violated his statutory rights, not just the statutory 
rights of other people, . . . [and] the interests protected by the statutory 
rights at issue [were] sufficiently concrete and particularized.”61 As a result, 
Robins was “among the injured,” and Congress could elevate the violation 
of his rights “to the status of legally cognizable injuries.”62 
2. Spokeo’s Superficial Holding: Procedural Standing Requires Injury-
in-Fact That Is Not Only Particularized but Also Concrete 
Spokeo’s holding is deceptively simple: Procedural standing requires 
injury-in-fact that is not only particularized but also concrete.63 The 
Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit’s holding, despite its 
reference to both particularity and concreteness, turned solely on the 
existence of particularized injury and entirely failed to analyze whether 
Robins’ injury was concrete, thus requiring remand as to concrete injury.64 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2017) (on remand) (citing the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(d)(1), (f) (2012)). 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 
 59. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016) (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681b(b)(1)) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), 1681e(d), 1681j(a)). 
 60. Id. at 1546.  
 61. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled by Spokeo, 136 
S. Ct. at 1540. 
 62. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). 
 63. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50. 
 64. Id. at 1548 (“Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, . . . [the] independent requirement 
[of concreteness] was elided.”). 
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Spokeo for the first time clarified that the Court’s oft-articulated 
requirement that standing necessitates an actual injury to the plaintiff that is 
“particularized and concrete” establishes two distinct inquiries: 
“particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact,” but 
particularization is not sufficient because “[a]n injury in fact must also be 
‘concrete.’”65 
Thus, standing requires two things. First, the plaintiff’s injury must be 
particularized—not merely an abstract, generalized interest in following the 
law, but instead a personal harm to the plaintiff. As explained in Section 
I.A.3, this principle undergirded the Court’s prior procedural standing 
decisions, which held that a generalized desire to correct unlawful agency 
conduct is insufficient to confer standing, notwithstanding Congress’s 
attempt to confer standing through just such a generalized enforcement 
right.66 Second, the “concrete” component of “particularized and concrete 
injury” has an independent meaning. To support standing, an injury must 
also meet the distinct requirement that it be “‘real’ and not ‘abstract.’”67 It 
must impose “de facto” harm on the plaintiff, which requires that “it must 
actually exist,”68 or there must be a “risk of real harm.”69  
The Court’s seemingly simple holding was that “[b]ecause the Ninth 
Circuit failed to fully appreciate the distinction between concreteness and 
particularization, its standing analysis was incomplete.”70 This result 
required remand for the Ninth Circuit to determine “whether the particular 
procedural violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk sufficient to 
meet the concreteness requirement.”71 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. 
 66. See cases cited infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
 67. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. 
 68. Id. In coming to this conclusion, the Court evaluated the definition of concrete. Id. 
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 472 (1971); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 305 (1967)).  
 69. Id. at 1549. As the dissent explained, though the Court had quite often used the 
phrase “particularized and concrete,” it had not previously been clear that those elements 
were distinct; the Court had not previously held that statutory injury to a particular person, 
arising from a congressionally granted right particularized to that person, was not thereby 
concrete. Id. at 1554–55 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. at 1550. 
 71. Id. On remand, the Ninth Circuit had no difficulty finding concrete injury along the 
lines suggested by the dissent. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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3. Procedural Standing Prior to Spokeo: Bare Procedural Enforcement 
Rights over Agency Decision-Making Don’t Confer Standing 
In order to understand Spokeo and how its novel approach fits into the 
Court’s prior articulation of procedural standing, it is useful at this point to 
pan back from Spokeo itself, and from its superficial holding that the Ninth 
Circuit had simply elided analysis of the concrete injury necessary for 
procedural standing. Only by first understanding these prior decisions is it 
possible to revisit Spokeo, appreciate the novelty of the third strand of 
procedural standing it introduces—instrumental rights—and understand its 
implications for future procedural standing cases. Spokeo applied the rubric 
of procedural standing in a context that significantly expanded the scope of 
the doctrine as reflected in the Court’s foundational procedural standing 
decision, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,72 and in subsequent cases echoing 
Lujan, such as Summers v. Earth Island Institute73 and Massachusetts v. 
EPA.74  
In those prior procedural standing cases, two statutory, procedural 
aspects had been present that placed the cases within the rubric of 
procedural standing. First, Congress had imposed a procedural decision-
making obligation on an administrative agency to constrain how or whether 
the agency was to make a decision, but not what substantive decision it was 
to make.75 Second, Congress had granted a procedural enforcement right—a 
cause of action—that purported to authorize “anyone” to bring suit 
challenging the agency’s failure to comply with that decision-making 
obligation.76 
Lujan involved claims brought by Defenders of Wildlife and other 
environmental groups under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).77 The ESA 
imposed a decision-making obligation on the Secretary of the Interior to 
issue regulations listing “endangered or threatened” species78 and requiring 
that other agencies engage in “consultation” with the Secretary of the 
Interior to prevent agency actions that would be “likely to jeopardize the 
                                                                                                                 
 72. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 73. 555 U.S. 488 (2009). 
 74. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  
 75. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568–71. 
 76. See, e.g., id. at 571–72. 
 77. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
557–58. 
 78. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536). 
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continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species.”79 The 
plaintiffs filed suit against the Secretary of the Interior alleging, inter alia, 
unlawful lack of consultation about certain actions outside the United 
States.80 The procedural enforcement mechanism came in the form of the 
ESA’s “citizen-suit” provision that allowed “any person” to bring a suit 
seeking to enjoin any person or agency he believes may have violated the 
ESA.81 
Lujan directly addressed the Eighth Circuit’s alternative holding that so-
called “procedural standing” afforded the plaintiff environmental groups 
standing, regardless of any injury to their actual interests. The Eighth 
Circuit, the Court explained, had held that the ESA’s “citizen-suit provision 
creates a ‘procedural righ[t]’ . . . so that anyone can file suit in federal court 
to challenge the Secretary’s . . . failure to follow the assertedly correct 
consultative procedure,” regardless of that person’s “inability to allege any 
discrete injury flowing from that failure.”82 
The Supreme Court rejected this approach to procedural standing. 
Lujan’s core holding is that a bare statutory enforcement right to challenge 
an agency’s decision-making obligation does not confer standing unless the 
plaintiff has a concrete interest in the substantive subject matter of the 
agency’s procedurally constrained decision.83 The plaintiffs could not, 
therefore, enforce an environmental decision-making obligation that 
Congress had imposed on an agency, notwithstanding Congress’s grant of 
an enforcement right purporting to authorize anyone to enforce that right.84 
Instead, to demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must show geographic 
proximity to the area allegedly endangered by the agency’s decision, which 
creates a concrete interest in the subject matter of that decision.85  
In other words, Congress cannot confer standing by purporting to grant a 
bare procedural enforcement right to sue on the basis of a general, non-
particularized interest in the proper administration of an agency’s decision-
making obligations. If the plaintiff has a concrete interest in the subject 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). 
 80. Id. at 559. 
 81. Id. at 571–72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)) (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. at 571–78 (quoting Defs. of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 121–22 (8th Cir. 
1990)). 
 83. Id. at 562–67; Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496–97 (2009) (“But 
deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the 
deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III standing.”). 
 84. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566–67. 
 85. See id. at 562–67; Summers, 555 U.S. at 496–97. 
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matter of the agency’s decision, however, then the enforcement right is not 
bare, and standing exists to enforce the decision-making right—regardless 
of any evidence that the outcome of a procedurally proper decision would 
have differed.86  
Lujan rejected the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that Congress could 
confer standing by granting a bare procedural enforcement mechanism for 
an agency’s failure to comply with a decision-making obligation, regardless 
of any connection between the plaintiff and the subject of that decision.87 
Instead, plaintiffs have procedural standing to challenge an agency’s 
violation of a decision-making obligation only if plaintiffs have a concrete 
interest in the outcome of the agency’s decision. Moreover, Justice Scalia 
specifically recognized the viability of procedural standing in the form at 
issue in Spokeo but not present in Lujan, instrumental rights, explaining: 
“This is not a case where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural 
requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest 
of theirs . . . .”88 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, which represents a high-water mark for 
expansive procedural standing, the Supreme Court found that 
Massachusetts and other intervenor states had standing to challenge the 
agency’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases.89 The Court held that when 
Congress grants “a litigant . . . ‘a procedural right to protect his concrete 
interests,’. . . [the litigant] ‘can assert that right without meeting all the 
normal standards for redressability and immediacy.’”90 The Court expressly 
embraced the D.C. Circuit’s recognition that such procedural rights, 
accorded by Congress for the purpose of protecting distinct, concrete 
interests, permit standing without the need to show concrete injury beyond 
the statutory violation itself.91 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–67; Summers, 555 U.S. at 496–97. 
 87. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 & n.8 (“[T]he court [of appeals] held that the injury-in-fact 
requirement had been satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, 
self-contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the procedures 
required by law. We reject this view.”). 
 88. Id. at 572. 
 89. 549 U.S 497, 526 (2007). 
 90. Id. at 517–18 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7) (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012)). 
 91. Id. at 518 (“A [litigant] who alleges a deprivation of a procedural protection to 
which he is entitled never has to prove that if he had received the procedure the substantive 
result would have been altered. All that is necessary is to show that the procedural step was 
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Thus, under Lujan and the other archetypal procedural standing cases, a 
plaintiff with a concrete interest in the outcome of an agency’s decision 
need not introduce any evidence showing that the decision, if made 
pursuant to the requisite decision-making obligation, would have actually 
benefited the plaintiff.92 Phrased differently, the denial of a procedural, 
decision-making right to a plaintiff with a concrete interest in the outcome 
of a decision need not be proved to cause the plaintiff any additional harm 
beyond the denial of that right itself.93 In contrast, congressional enactment 
of a bare procedural enforcement right, i.e., an “abstract, self-contained, 
noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the procedures 
required by law,” is insufficient to confer standing.94 Implicitly, in a 
principle not taken up again until Spokeo, congressional enactment of an 
instrumental procedural right intended to protect distinct concrete interests 
is sufficient to confer standing. 
The Court first began to require concrete injury-in-fact and wrestle with 
procedural standing after Congress enacted numerous statutes that imposed 
procedural, rather than substantive, obligations on administrative agencies 
in the mid-twentieth century.95 By passing the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA)96 in 1946, Congress expressly mandated an “entitle[ment] to 
judicial review” for any “person suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute,”97 including the right to challenge agency 
actions that failed to observe “procedure required by law.”98 As the 
Supreme Court recognized in 1950, the APA established “a new, basic and 
                                                                                                                 
connected to the substantive result.”) (quoting Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. 
Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
 92. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. 
 93. Id. (“The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete 
interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and 
immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed 
construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency’s 
failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with 
any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even 
though the dam will not be completed for many years.”). 
 94. Id. at 573 (emphasis added). 
 95. See Sunstein, What’s Standing, supra note 17, at 179–82. 
 96. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)). 
 97. 5 U.S.C. § 702.  
 98. Id. § 706(2)(D). 
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comprehensive regulation of procedures in many agencies,” expanding 
administrative adjudication in “one of the dramatic legal developments of 
the past half-century.”99 
In the following decades, Congress passed numerous statutes, largely 
concerning the environment, that imposed procedural decision-making 
obligations on agencies and granted an express procedural enforcement 
right, either to anyone, or (opaquely) to anyone aggrieved by the agency 
action. Prominent among these statutes was the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA),100 which requires “the preparation of an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS)” before the government undertakes any “major 
Federal action.”101 The Court read NEPA and similar statutes as imposing 
action-forcing, procedural obligations on agency decisions, even though 
those decisions are not subject to judicial assessment for substantive 
wisdom.102  
Congress similarly passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA), which was also predicated on a proceduralist conception, in 
1975.103 As Professor Herz explained the vision, “We search for pure 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36–37 (1950). 
 100. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012)). 
 101. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 336 (1989) (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 4332 (2012)). 
 102. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 
(1978); accord Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28 
(1980); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); see also Eric W. Orts, 
Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1254 (1995) (“The primary 
regulatory method employed by reflexive environmental law is therefore procedural; it aims 
to set up processes that encourage institutional self-reflective thinking and learning about 
environmental effects.”); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative 
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (1975) (arguing, prior to Lujan, that “[i]n the space of a 
few years the Supreme Court has largely eliminated the doctrine of standing as a barrier to 
challenging agency action in court . . . . Increasingly, the function of administrative law is 
not the protection of private autonomy but the provision of a surrogate political process to 
ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected interests in the process of 
administrative decision.”). 
 103. See Education for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (ECHA), Pub. L. No. 94–
142, 89 Stat. 773 (superseded 1990). The act was renamed IDEA upon its reauthorization in 
1990. See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 
104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 
(2012)); id. § 901, 104 Stat. at 1141–42; see also Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982) (endorsing “the legislative conviction that 
adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not 
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procedural justice—if only we can devise exactly the right procedures, 
outcomes will take care of themselves. In American public law, the 
preoccupation with and confidence in procedural remedies peaked in the 
1970s.”104 This background, which focused on administrative agencies’ 
compliance with novel forms of procedural obligation imposed by the 
administrative state, paved the way for the first round of procedural 
standing decisions, including Lujan. 
4. Spokeo’s Opaque Recapitulation of the Established Principles of 
Procedural Standing 
Spokeo provides an overview of procedural standing by recapitulating a 
grab bag of principles from previous standing cases—some that were 
obviously within the procedural standing universe prior to Spokeo and 
others that were not. It begins by briefly pointing to the separation-of-
powers underpinning for Article III standing generally, as well as the three 
core elements of standing: injury, causation, and redressability.105 Spokeo 
quickly focuses on the “[f]irst and foremost” of those elements: “injury in 
fact.”106 Spokeo holds that injury in fact must not only be particularized to 
the plaintiff, but also “concrete,” which means that the injury “must 
actually exist,” and that it be “‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”107 
The Court explains that “‘[c]oncrete’ is not . . . synonymous with 
‘tangible,’” because even denials of “intangible injuries,” such as denial of 
free speech and free exercise rights, “can nevertheless be concrete.”108 The 
Court then notes the relevance of “historical practice,” i.e., whether the 
injury is of a sort that would historically have “been regarded as providing a 
                                                                                                                 
all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP”); David L. Kirp, 
Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841, 
862–64 (1976). See generally Romberg, supra note 48 (explicating the primacy of 
procedural protections under the IDEA). 
 104. Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property, 93 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1668, 1668 (1993) (footnote omitted); see also Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and 
Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values”, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974). 
 105. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). 
 106. Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). 
 107. Id. at 1548 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009); WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 472 (1971); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 305 (1967)). 
 108. Id. at 1549. 
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basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts,” and thus so regarded by 
the drafters of Article III.109  
Furthermore, “because Congress is well positioned to identify intangible 
harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judgment is also 
instructive and important,” both through creating “legally cognizable 
injuries” and through the broader principles found in Justice Kennedy’s 
Lujan concurrence.110 The Spokeo Court reiterated Justice Kennedy’s 
statement that “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate 
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none 
existed before.”111 
Spokeo, though noting “Congress’ role in identifying and elevating 
intangible harms,” specifically reaffirms the holding of Lujan and Summers 
that, despite Congress’s broad powers, its intent is not necessarily 
dispositive: Congress cannot simply enact a procedural enforcement 
mechanism (i.e., create a cause of action to sue for an abstract, non-concrete 
injury) and thereby establish standing.112 A plaintiff “could not, for 
example, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete 
harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.”113 
Concrete injury is thus necessary. But Spokeo is careful to point out that 
not only harm itself but “the risk of real harm can[] satisfy the requirement 
of concreteness.”114 By way of analogy, Spokeo points to the general risk of 
concrete injury arising from the violation of certain categories of legal 
rights that have historically been subject to suit under the common law.115  
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (citing and discussing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). 
 111. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment)). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009); Lujan, 504 U.S. 
at 572). 
 114. Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013)). 
 115. Id. (“For example, the law has long permitted recovery by certain tort victims even 
if their harms may be difficult to prove or measure.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS 
§§ 569, 570 (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (libel and slander per se, respectively)). Though the 
Court does not mention it, suit has similarly been permissible, absent proof of concrete 
harm, for claims such as breach of contract (in which nominal damages are recoverable, 
regardless of actual damages); unjust enrichment; property offenses such as trespass; and 
various infringements of intellectual property—all of which are actionable without proof of 
harm. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 9, at 216–17. But cf. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 625 
(2004) (discussing certain defamation torts, unlike the claims discussed above, which are 
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In a crucial passage, Spokeo observes that “[j]ust as the common law 
permitted suit in such instances, the violation of a procedural right granted 
by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in 
fact. . . . [A] plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm 
beyond the one Congress has identified.”116 In other words, the procedural, 
statutory violation itself is sometimes enough to demonstrate concrete 
injury (and thus afford standing) without the need to demonstrate any 
additional harm under the facts of the particular case.117 
Spokeo cites to Federal Election Commission v. Akins to illustrate this 
point.118 Spokeo characterizes Akins as “confirming that a group of voters’ 
‘inability to obtain information’ that Congress had decided to make public 
is a sufficient injury in fact to satisfy Article III.”119 Spokeo thereby 
identifies Akins, decided six years after Lujan, as a procedural standing 
case—even though Akins does not appear to have anything to do with 
procedural standing. Akins held that a group of voters had standing to 
challenge the Federal Election Commission’s refusal to provide information 
that the voters argued had to be disclosed under the Federal Election 
Campaign Act.120 Akins referred to Lujan and procedural standing only in 
passing, and by distinguishing Lujan because the claims in that case were 
based on “generalized grievance[s]” and “harm . . . of an abstract and 
indefinite nature.”121 Akins, in contrast, found “concrete and specific” 
“informational injury” from denial of the statutory right itself, though the 
Court also observed that it found “no reason to doubt [plaintiffs’] claim that 
the information would help them (and others to whom they would 
communicate it) to evaluate candidates for public office.”122  
Spokeo similarly points to Public Citizen v. Department of Justice as a 
procedural standing case, establishing that “failure to obtain information 
subject to disclosure [by statute] ‘constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to 
                                                                                                                 
“not actionable per se” and thus allow general damages only after proof of “special harm” of 
a material and ordinarily pecuniary nature).  
 116. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 
20–25 (1998); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)). 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. (citing Akins, 524 U.S. at 11). 
 119. Id. (quoting Akins, 524 U.S. at 20–25). 
 120. Akins, 524 U.S. at 19–21. The Federal Election Campaign Act can be found as 
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146 (2018). 
 121. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23–24 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–78 
(1992); L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S. 295, 303 (1940)). 
 122. Id. at 21, 24–25. 
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provide standing to sue.’”123 Denial of these statutory rights was sufficient 
on its own for standing because the right to information was generally 
intended to further a distinct, concrete interest. 
Finally, Spokeo attempts to sort these disparate “general principles” into 
two guideposts for resolving procedural standing under the FCRA: 
On the one hand, Congress plainly sought to curb the 
dissemination of false information [in credit reports] by adopting 
procedures designed to decrease that risk. On the other hand, 
Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a 
bare procedural violation. A violation of one of the FCRA’s 
procedural requirements may result in no harm.124 
Spokeo thereby establishes several new principles of procedural standing. 
The Court’s overt holding is that a statutory procedural right, even if 
particularized to an individual plaintiff, is insufficient for standing without 
some further connection to concrete injury. The Court also implicitly 
establishes three further principles. First, statutory procedural rights as 
against private parties (not just as against public agencies) are subject to 
procedural standing analysis. Second, instrumental statutory rights—i.e., 
those enacted to further a distinct, concrete interest beyond the denial of the 
right itself—exist within the procedural standing universe. And third, 
“bare” procedural rights are no longer limited to enforcement rights that do 
not require a connection to the possibility of concrete injury; they also refer 
to instrumental rights if violation of the instrumental right does not give rise 
to any risk of concrete injury to the distinct interest the instrumental right is 
intended to further. 
But Spokeo left even more questions unresolved. In some circumstances, 
statutory, procedural violations do not require proof of further, concrete 
injury. Which circumstances are those? When proof of further, concrete 
injury is required, how is that determination to be made? When should 
courts defer to congressional judgment about the chain of causation 
between an instrumental right and the risk of concrete injury it was 
designed to protect? When should courts, in assessing the existence of a 
risk of real harm arising from violation of an instrumental right, find the 
statutory violation itself sufficient for standing? And when should courts 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50 (quoting Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 
440, 449 (1989)). 
 124. Id. at 1550. 
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require a plaintiff to show an additional risk of harm under the 
circumstances of the case? 
B. Spokeo’s Embrace of the Role of History and the Role of Congress 
In the course of its discussion, Spokeo briefly nods to the role of history 
and congressional judgment in informing the existence of procedural 
standing.125 But Spokeo does not explain much further about either or, 
notably, anything about the interaction between the two.  
1. History 
Spokeo provides a one-sentence explanation of how and why historical 
practice informs procedural standing: 
Because the doctrine of standing derives from the case-or-
controversy requirement, and because that requirement in turn is 
grounded in historical practice, it is instructive to consider 
whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a 
harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for 
a lawsuit in English or American courts.126  
The majority opinion provides no further analysis.  
In contrast, Justice Thomas’s concurrence provides a relatively in-depth 
exploration of the judicial treatment of suits brought against private parties 
for violation of private rights. In doing so, he explains that “[h]istorically, 
common-law courts possessed broad power to adjudicate suits involving the 
alleged violation of private rights, even when plaintiffs alleged only the 
violation of those rights and nothing more.”127 Despite the merits of this 
historical approach, it was rejected by every other member of the Court 
rejected (or, perhaps more accurately, ignored). Both the majority opinion 
and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent require, for at least some types of claims 
against a private defendant (including the FCRA claim in Spokeo), that the 
plaintiff demonstrate a real risk of concrete injury beyond the statutory 
violation itself.128 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. at 1549 (“In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, 
both history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.”). 
 126. Id. (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 
775–77 (2000)). 
 127. Id. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring); see infra Section I.D. 
 128. See Craig Konnoth & Seth Kreimer, Spelling Out Spokeo, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 47, 55 (2016) (“[H]aving put history and tradition on the table, one might have 
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A critical question remains open on which the courts of appeals are split: 
Is a historical analog to the asserted procedural right necessary, or simply 
sufficient, for procedural standing?129 The Fourth Circuit held that a 
comparable historical analog offers one route to procedural standing, but its 
absence does not in any way cut against the existence of standing.130 In 
contrast, the Third and Ninth Circuits have used language that seems to 
suggest that a historical analog is necessary, not merely sufficient.131 
2. Congress 
Spokeo also acknowledges the significant role of congressional intent. 
The Court explains that “because Congress is well positioned to identify 
intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judgment 
is also instructive and important.”132 Spokeo then quotes Justice Kennedy’s 
Lujan concurrence, which recognizes that “Congress has the power to 
                                                                                                                 
expected Justice Alito to address the rather robust Anglo-American history of statutes 
allowing private parties to collect bounties for enforcing public duties. . . . But Justice 
Alito’s majority opinion declined to engage with these or other historical statutory analogies 
to the FCRA.”). 
 129. See infra Section V.A (explaining that the better view is that a historical analog is 
sufficient but not necessary). 
 130. Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[The 
plaintiff] does not propose a common law analogue for his alleged FCRA injury, and we find 
no traditional right of action that is comparable. The lack of a common law analogue is not 
fatal to his case, but it also does not help him establish a concrete injury.”) (internal citations 
omitted) (citing Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989); Vt. Agency of 
Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000)); see also id. 
(concluding that Public Citizen “find[s] a ‘sufficiently discrete injury’ without finding that a 
similar right existed at common law”) (quoting Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449). 
 131. Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 323–24 (3d Cir. 2018) (observing that 
the plaintiff satisfied “Spokeo’s congressional test,” and “the second Spokeo test, the 
historical test, is also met. Because the statute meets both tests, and because Plaintiffs have 
alleged sufficient concrete harm, they have standing to bring their claim”); Dutta v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2018) (“In making the first 
inquiry, we ask whether Congress enacted the statute at issue to protect a concrete interest 
that is akin to a historical, common law interest.”). 
Ironically, though Long articulates a more stringent test for historical analogy, it applies 
the overall test for procedural standing flexibly, finding procedural standing to exist, 
whereas Dreher articulates the proper, less strict test for historical standing but then applies 
the overall test for procedural standing exceedingly stringently. 
 132. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
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define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case 
or controversy where none existed before.”133 
 As detailed further in Part III, Spokeo thereby acknowledges (albeit 
briefly) the deference it owes to congressional judgment about standing 
and, in particular, to congressional judgment about the “chains of 
causation” between instrumental rights and the ultimate, concrete harm with 
which Congress is concerned. The Court, however, clouds the centrality of 
congressional judgment in two ways.  
First, it concludes that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury 
even in the context of a statutory violation,” thus precluding suit based on 
an “allege[d] . . . bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete 
harm.”134 This is the central disagreement between Justice Thomas and the 
other members of the Court; the majority recognizes that Congress may not 
enact automatically enforceable bare procedural enforcement rights, as in 
Lujan. But it also rejects Justice Thomas’s approach, seemingly consistent 
with Lujan, that instrumental rights against private parties, if particularized 
to the plaintiff (rather than serving an interest in general compliance with 
the law), are sufficient for standing. Spokeo requires a tighter connection 
between the instrumental right and risk of the concrete harm with which 
Congress is ultimately concerned. 
Second, and more opaquely, Spokeo also complicates its boilerplate 
recitation of standing principles by repeating the bromide that “Congress 
cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the 
right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”135 
Facially, this reads as if Spokeo endorses the idea that congressional 
judgment cannot alter how the Court would otherwise assess procedural 
standing in the context of the instrumental rights at issue in Spokeo; this 
language, however, simply means—or at least meant, prior to Spokeo—that 
a bare grant of a procedural enforcement right is ineffective as to a plaintiff 
who has no particularized interest in the outcome of a procedural decision-
making obligation. 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
 134. Id. (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009)). 
 135. Id. at 1547–48 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)); see also id. 
at 1549 (“Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a 
plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a 
person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right. 
Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”). 
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Spokeo imports this idea of a bare procedural right into the instrumental 
rights context without acknowledging the novelty or importance of this 
move; the Court apparently concludes that not only enforcement rights, but 
also instrumental rights, may be bare. Instrumental rights, however, are by 
definition intended to protect against some distinct harm. In all but bizarre 
circumstances, the distinct, target harm with which Congress is ultimately 
concerned is a real-world, concrete harm. So the question is not whether the 
instrumental right is “bare” because it has no connection to any concrete 
harm, but rather whether it is insufficiently connected to a real risk of such 
harm.136 Spokeo has metamorphosed bare enforcement right to mean 
insufficient instrumental right. 
C. Spokeo’s Confounding Examples of No Material Risk of Concrete Harm 
The majority in Spokeo closes its analysis by providing two examples of 
a violation of “the FCRA’s procedural requirements” that, it opines, “may 
result in no harm” and thus amount to “a bare procedural violation.”137 In 
particular, the Court expresses skepticism that either of the following would 
establish standing: (1) a credit report that contains an erroneous zip code, or 
(2) a credit reporting agency’s failure to provide the required notice to a 
credit report user if the underlying information in the credit report was 
entirely correct.138  
As explained below, these examples are mistaken on their own terms. 
Even more fundamentally, both can be misinterpreted to suggest a narrower 
approach to procedural standing than Spokeo intends; misconstruction of 
these two brief examples, tacked on to the end of the majority decision in 
dicta, could sharply curtail the possibility of judicial redress for claimants 
under process-heavy statutes, including consumers, environmentalists, and 
educationally disabled children. 
                                                                                                                 
 136. As explained in Parts IV and V, (1) for an instrumental automatically injurious right, 
the question is whether the court finds Congress unjustified in its conclusion that violation of 
the statutory right categorically demonstrates material risk of harm to the concrete right, and 
(2) for an instrumental presumptively injurious right, whether the court finds the plaintiff has 
failed to demonstrate material risk of additional, concrete injury. See infra Parts IV–V. 
 137. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. 
 138. Id. (“For example, even if a consumer reporting agency fails to provide the required 
notice to a user of the agency’s consumer information, that information regardless may be 
entirely accurate. In addition, not all inaccuracies cause harm or present any material risk of 
harm. An example that comes readily to mind is an incorrect zip code. It is difficult to 
imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any 
concrete harm.”). 
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1. Defective Notice to Users When a Credit Report Contains No 
Inaccuracies 
Spokeo’s first example is when “a consumer reporting agency fails to 
provide the required notice to a user of the agency’s consumer information” 
but that consumer information is “entirely accurate.”139 The Court, 
however, apparently misapprehends the nature of the notice the FCRA 
obligates reporting agencies to provide to users of consumer information; 
the purpose for that notice simply does not relate to the accuracy of the 
information in the consumer report. The FCRA provision mandating notice 
to users requires that a “consumer reporting agency shall provide to any 
person . . . to whom a consumer report is provided by the agency[] a notice 
of such person’s responsibilities under this subchapter.”140  
And the user’s responsibilities under the FCRA do not relate to the 
accuracy of the information in the credit report. Instead, those 
responsibilities include the fact that consumer reports may be furnished to 
users only for limited purposes specified by the FCRA, and that 
“prospective users of the information [in a credit report must] identify 
themselves, certify the purposes for which the information is sought, and 
certify that the information will be used for no other purpose.”141 These 
obligations on users of a credit report do not relate to the accuracy of the 
credit report, instead focusing on users’ authorized purposes for accessing 
the credit report, accurate or otherwise. Because improper use of even an 
accurate credit report is unlawful and harmful, failure to notify users of the 
scope of authorized use (intended to lessen the likelihood of unauthorized 
use) is not made harmless by a report’s substantive accuracy.142  
A significant concern would arise if one read Spokeo as if it understood 
the nature of the notice requirement, but that it believed congressional 
intent in enacting the FCRA to be limited to the single, overriding purpose 
of increasing accuracy in credit reports. Under this construction, any other 
purpose reflected in any provision of the FCRA that does not directly 
further the single goal of accuracy could not possibly result in concrete 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Id. 
 140. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(d)(1)(B) (2018). 
 141. Id. § 1681e(a). 
 142. See Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding 
Spokeo’s discussion of the examples to be “probably dicta, because the case before the Court 
concerned inaccurate information,” and the Court’s rumination about claims of inadequate 
notice from the agency to a user (such as a potential employer) entirely outside the scope of 
anything possibly relevant to the case). 
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injury. But this troubling reading (of Spokeo, and of the notice provision of 
the FCRA) is entirely unconvincing; notice to users of their FCRA 
obligations is plainly intended to increase the likelihood that users comply 
with those obligations. And other constructions of this example are more 
plausible. 
First, the majority may have simply erred by failing to recognize that the 
required notice to users informs them of obligations that are wholly 
unconnected to a credit report’s accuracy. Second, the Court, in referring to 
notice to users, may have intended to refer obliquely to the FCRA’s 
obligation on credit reporting agencies to post toll-free numbers so that 
users can request credit reports—a duty mentioned earlier in the opinion, 
and one arguably rendered irrelevant absent some inaccuracy in the 
report.143  
Perhaps most charitably, one could read Spokeo as implicitly assuming 
that the only claim that Robins raised was a violation of § 1681e(b), which 
requires “reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy.”144 
On that plausible assumption—which Robins expressly endorsed on 
remand145—violation of some other FCRA right (such as the duty to 
provide notice to users) could not contribute to the claimed violation of 
§ 1681e(b) unless the failure to provide notice undermined the report’s 
accuracy, the only purpose underlying the claim Robins actually raised. 
Thus, the Court’s discussion of the notice obligation should not be 
understood to suggest, problematically, that an instrumental right does not 
afford standing unless it furthers the single, central purpose of a statute. 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Consumers have reason to access their credit reports, other than contesting 
inaccurate information, so the example would be misplaced. However, Robins may well not 
have had standing for any violation of the duty to post toll-free numbers, either because 
Robins’s complaint acknowledged he had access to his credit report online, so he was not 
injured by the failure to post the toll-free number, or because, as Justice Thomas suggests, 
that right is owed to the public as a whole, so Robins would need to show additional, 
particularized and concrete injury not apparently present. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1553 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 144. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 
 145. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1116 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[F]ollowing 
remand from the Supreme Court, Robins now insists that [his] ‘inartfully styled . . . 
“claims”’ are not alleged as independent grounds for relief but instead serve as ‘merely 
examples of Spokeo’s willful failure to use reasonable procedures and to assure maximum 
possible accuracy in its published reports.’ Robins now states that he has alleged only ‘a 
single claim for relief under Section 1681e(b).’”). 
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Instead, the Court is either confused about the nature of the notice 
obligation, or elliptical in its elucidation of that obligation. 
2. An Incorrect Zip Code 
Spokeo’s second example of a potentially bare instrumental violation is 
even more confounding. The Court explains that “not all inaccuracies cause 
harm or present any material risk of harm. An example that comes readily 
to mind is an incorrect zip code. It is difficult to imagine how the 
dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any 
concrete harm.”146 
In actuality, it is difficult to imagine information in a credit report (apart 
from, perhaps, a social security number) that is more likely than a zip code 
to cause harm if incorrect. As the Court’s opinion observes, “Spokeo 
markets its services to a variety of users, including not only ‘employers 
who want to evaluate prospective employees,’ but also ‘those who want to 
investigate prospective romantic partners or seek other personal 
information.’”147 First, potential employers quite plausibly screen potential 
employees based on geographical proximity to the place of employment, 
for legitimate or illegitimate reasons.148 
And those deciding whether to extend credit paradigmatically do so by 
reviewing credit reports. As a historical matter, it is difficult to imagine a 
piece of information more problematically related to the extension of credit 
than zip code. Under this country’s troubled history of redlining, lenders 
refuse to extend credit based on zip code (often with a discriminatory intent 
or impact) rather than on individual credit-worthiness.149  
                                                                                                                 
 146. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550; see also Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 128, at 60 & 
n.102 (explaining that harm from an erroneous zip code is not hard to imagine, pointing to 
the possibility that mail with an incorrect zip code might not be delivered). 
 147. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546 (quoting Brief for Respondent 7). 
 148. See Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 417 (2018) 
(explaining that artificially intelligent hiring algorithms “might . . . hire applicants residing 
in nearby zip codes and reject those living further away”); see also Matthew T. Bodie et al., 
The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 961, 1014–15 (2017) (“A bad 
actor who does not want to hire African Americans or who wants to hire more white 
employees can hide this unlawful motive by basing the decision on zip code, distance to 
work, or something similar that targets location.”). 
 149. Michael Harriot, Redlining: The Origin Story of Institutional Racism, ROOT (Apr. 
25, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.theroot.com/redlining-the-origin-story-of-institutional-
racism-1834308539 (“Residents who live in redlined areas pay higher interest rates and are 
denied mortgages more often than whites with the same credit and income, according to 
reporting for the Center for Investigative Journalism. People in redlined areas pay higher 
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The link between zip code and perceived credit-worthiness is far from a 
historical relic. As President Obama stated in a 2015 weekly address, 
Just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court . . . recognized what 
many people know to be true from their own lives: that too often, 
where people live determines what opportunities they have in 
life. . . . In this country, of all countries, a person’s zip code 
shouldn’t decide their destiny.150 
Indeed, as the Washington Post reported in 2008 and again in 2015, banks 
and mortgage lenders still use zip codes in deciding whether to extend 
credit: 
Critics call it the new redlining: Many of the country’s largest 
mortgage lenders are imposing loan restrictions in entire 
counties or Zip codes that they rank as risky or “declining.”  
 . . . . 
 . . . If a major lender has tagged your Zip code, county or 
entire metropolitan area with a scarlet letter—and they exist in 
nearly every state, including many in places generally assumed 
to have relatively healthy market conditions—you’re going to 
need more cash upfront.151 
                                                                                                                 
auto insurance rates, ProPublica reports. Homes in black neighborhoods are valued, on 
average, $48,000 less than homes in white neighborhoods with similar crime rates and 
amenities.”). See generally David I. Badain, Insurance Redlining and the Future of the 
Urban Core, 16 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (1980) (examining the redlining problem 
related to insurance and effectiveness of government actions attempting to address this 
issue). 
 150. Weekly Address: Making Our Communities Stronger Through Fair Housing, WHITE 
HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (July 11, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
the-press-office/2015/07/11/weekly-address-making-our-communities-stronger-through-fair-
housing. 
 151. Kenneth R. Harney, Zip Code ‘Redlining’: A Sweeping View of Risk, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 2, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/01/
AR2008020101680.html; see also Emily Badger, Redlining: Still a Thing, WASH. POST 
(May 28, 2015, 6:30 AM CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/05/
28/evidence-that-banks-still-deny-black-borrowers-just-as-they-did-50-years-ago/ (“[B]lack 
communities have warned that [redlining] still exists in subtler and changed forms, in bank 
tactics that have targeted these same neighborhoods for predatory lending, or in new patterns 
like ‘retail redlining.’ Some of the persistent redlining . . . still looks an awful lot like the 
original.”). 
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Similarly, “[e]xperts . . . say they believe banks may now be using data 
collected by customers to compare them to other shoppers at individual 
retail locations or by zip code, weeding out customers in neighborhoods 
hardest hit by the economic downturn.”152 And potential romantic partners, 
another target audience for Spokeo, are also highly focused on zip code, 
both for concrete and intangible reasons.153 
Concern arising from the Court’s zip code example does not relate (at 
least primarily) to the Court’s surprisingly limited imagination. Rather, it 
would be highly concerning if the Court were understood to require that a 
plaintiff establish procedural standing for an instrumental right by 
demonstrating a stronger causal link than that between an incorrect zip code 
and the risk of real-world harm.  
This zip code example, however, should be understood as judicial 
myopia, rather than as an implicit imposition of an almost impossibly 
stringent test for risk of real harm. A careful reading of Spokeo provides the 
textual basis for a properly narrow interpretation. The opinion states that 
“[i]t is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, 
without more, could work any concrete harm.”154 If one excludes the 
relevance of anything more than the zip code error itself, then the Court is 
best understood as simply intending to suggest that the mere existence of an 
error in a credit report, without any evidence of some meaningful, real-
                                                                                                                 
 152. Chris Cuomo et al., ‘GMA’ Gets Answers: Some Credit Card Companies 
Financially Profiling Customers, ABC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2009, 5:47 AM), https://abcnews.go. 
com/GMA/TheLaw/gma-answers-credit-card-companies-financially-profiling-customers/sto 
ry?id=6747461; see also Adam Tanner, Never Give Stores Your ZIP Code. Here’s Why, 
FORBES (June 19, 2013, 08:19 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/06/19/
theres-a-billion-reasons-not-to-give-stores-your-zip-code-ever (“Why make such a big deal 
over five digits that only records that someone lives in the same area as many thousands of 
others? Because along with other information, the ZIP code may provide the final clue to 
figuring out your address, phone number and past purchasing details, if a sales clerk sees 
your name while swiping your credit card.”). 
 153. Lea Rose Emery, Tinder’s Most Right-Swiped Neighborhoods in Your City, BUSTLE 
(June 15, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/tinders-most-right-swiped-neighborhoods-in-
your-city-9413721 (noting that Tinder was able to identify locations in certain cities where 
residents were more likely to be “swiped right” most often); see also Anna Davies, Here Are 
the Dating Lies It’s Okay to Tell, N.Y. POST (Nov. 7, 2014, 9:20 PM), https://nypost. 
com/2014/11/07/the-dating-lies-its-okay-to-tell/ (“Stephanie loved her Long Island City 
neighborhood. But the 32-year-old lawyer was dismayed at the dearth of eligible matches 
she found on various online dating sites—until she changed her ZIP code to the Union 
Square area.”). 
 154. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (emphasis added). 
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world effect, does not work a concrete injury, and the Court’s choice of zip 
code as exemplar of triviality was oddly, but irrelevantly, misguided.155 
D. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence 
Justice Thomas concurred in Spokeo, expressing a historically grounded 
openness to standing for particularized claims brought against private 
parties.156 As he explained, separation of powers “concern[s are] generally 
absent when a private plaintiff seeks to enforce only his personal rights 
against another private party.”157 Justice Thomas’s concurrence points to 
the historical distinction between the strict requirements of standing applied 
when a plaintiff asserts public rights as against the government, as in Lujan, 
as opposed to the much more flexible bases considered sufficient for 
standing purposes when a private party asserts statutory rights as against a 
private defendant.158 Thus, Justice Thomas argues that “a plaintiff seeking 
to vindicate a statutorily created private right need not allege actual harm 
beyond the invasion of that private right.”159  
This position is entirely consistent with Justice Scalia’s observation in 
Lujan that “it is clear that in suits against the Government, at least, the 
concrete injury requirement must remain.”160 In an article that insightfully 
highlights the numerous, puzzling questions that Spokeo left open, 
Professor Baude recognizes the significant historical support for Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See Tyler J. Domino, Note, Certifying Statutory Class Actions in the Shadow of Due 
Process, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1977, 1994 n.109 (2017) (“This aside about the zip code cannot 
be taken literally.”). 
 156. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas’s heavy 
reliance on historical understanding, and relative lack of concern with stare decisis, may 
explain his openness to procedural standing, notwithstanding his general approach to 
separation of powers. 
 157. Id. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 158. Id. at 1553 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]here one private party has alleged that 
another private party violated his private rights, there is generally no danger that the private 
party’s suit is an impermissible attempt to police the activity of the political branches or, 
more broadly, that the legislative branch has impermissibly delegated law enforcement 
authority from the executive to a private individual.”) (citing Hessick, supra note 32, at 317–
21).  
 159. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 
373–74 (1982); Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137–38 (1939)). 
 160. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (emphasis added). 
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Thomas’s distinction between suits against public and private defendants, 
as documented by Professor Andrew Hessick and others.161 
Whatever its merits, however, no other member of the Court joined 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence. Indeed, his concurrence is in significantly 
more tension with the majority’s analysis than is Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, 
which was joined only by Justice Sotomayor. The dissent did not disagree 
with the majority’s statement that an incorrect zip code (without more) 
would not be enough for standing. Moreover, it did not suggest that a minor 
error in a credit report would afford standing, either as a particularized 
violation as against a private party (as Justice Thomas suggested) or even 
because an incorrect zip code would present a risk of real harm using even 
the most stunted of judicial imaginations.162  
Instead, the dissent diverged from the majority’s decision to remand on 
the issue of concrete injury unaddressed below because it felt the existence 
of concrete injury to be manifest. Justice Ginsburg explained, in a 
convincing but exceedingly narrow manner, that remand as to concrete 
injury was unnecessary because Robins had plainly alleged a risk of real 
harm: “Far from an incorrect zip code, Robins complains of misinformation 
about his education, family situation, and economic status, inaccurate 
representations that could affect his fortune in the job market.”163 Thus, 
because Justice Thomas’s concurrence is ignored by the rest of the Court, 
and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent diverges from the majority’s analysis on 
narrow grounds, eight members of the Court in Spokeo embraced applying 
procedural standing principles to statutory instrumental rights as against 
private parties. 
II. Judicial Turbulence in Spokeo’s Wake 
A. The Supreme Court’s Recent Intimations About Procedural Standing 
In the wake of Justice Kennedy’s retirement from the Supreme Court and 
the appointment of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, Spokeo has claimed a 
seat at the war-room table for the conservative majority’s revolution-in-the-
making. The Court has signaled that it will apply separation-of-powers 
principles to limit the legislative and executive branches’ power to 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Baude, supra note 9, at 227–30 (“Justice Thomas, who joined the majority opinion 
in full, wrote a concurring opinion that put forward a proposed rule that is both theoretically 
and historically consistent and that may provide a way to reconcile the tension . . . .”). 
 162. See supra Section I.C.2. 
 163. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
554 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:517 
 
 
implement judicially enforceable legislation and regulations.164 One case 
from 2012 and two from 2019 provide insight into the future of procedural 
standing that the Court seems to envision. 
The Court’s awareness of procedural standing as an important arena in 
which the separation-of-powers debate will unfold has been manifest since 
2012, four years prior to Spokeo. The battle began in First American 
Financial Corp. v. Edwards,165 a case that Stanford Law’s Professor Pamela 
Karlan and SCOTUSblog’s Kevin Russell called “the sleeper case of the 
Term.”166  
As Karlan explained, First American “float[ed] the possibility of a new 
conception of injury-in-fact” necessary for standing, a requirement that the 
plaintiff prove actual or threatened harm beyond the statutory, procedural 
violations itself.167 In so doing, 
First American had the potential to undermine an enforcement 
technique Congress has been using in a variety of fields: having 
proscribed certain conduct, Congress then confers a statutory 
right to sue on individuals subjected to the conduct without 
requiring proof of injury beyond violation of the statutory 
duty.168  
Karlan, in her 2012 article, pointed to the Court’s imposition of procedural 
hurdles to undercut the other branches’ efforts to protect citizens. As she 
observed, “In a variety of arenas, the Roberts Court has been cutting back 
not on the content of rights or duties but on their enforceability . . . .”169 
That inclination has become even more pronounced with the appointment 
of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. 
First American involved a claim under the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA) that prohibited “‘any fee, kickback, or 
thing of value’ in exchange for business referrals” in covered mortgage 
                                                                                                                 
 164. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019); Gundy v. United States, 
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135 (2019). 
 165. 567 U.S. 756, 757 (2012) (dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted). 
 166. Karlan, supra note 16, at 61 (quoting Kevin Russell, First American Financial v. 
Edwards: Surprising End to a Potentially Important Case, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 7:00 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/first-american-financial-v-edwards-surprising-end-
to-a-potentially-important-case/). 
 167. Id. at 61. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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transactions.170 Edwards alleged that First American had entered into such 
“kickback” agreements, intended to result in exclusive referrals of title 
insurance business, in direct violation of RESPA.171  
First American argued, however, that Edwards lacked standing to sue for 
the unlawful kickback due to an unusual quirk of Ohio law, which set the 
price for title insurance.172 First American argued that, given the set price, 
Edwards was not injured by the kickback scheme and the business First 
American therefore received because Edwards was charged the same price 
she would otherwise have been charged, even absent the kickback, 
regardless of who provided her with title insurance.173 The Ninth Circuit 
held that Edwards established an injury under Article III because “[t]he 
injury required by Article III can exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating 
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’”174 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, despite the absence of a circuit split, to consider this 
issue of procedural standing.175 
At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts—no stranger to procedural 
standing176—made a particularly insightful comment to Edwards’ counsel. 
Roberts explored three possibilities for the role of concrete injury-in-fact, 
beyond the statutory violation, in establishing standing: 
I’m having trouble getting my arms around . . . what your 
position is . . . [. T]here are three possible arguments. One is that 
there is injury-in-fact in this case. . . . Two, that Congress 
presumes injury-in-fact. Injury-in-fact is still required, but that is 
presumed. . . . Or, three, that injury in fact is not required at all 
[and the statutory violation on its own is sufficient].177 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 610 F.3d 514, 517 (9th Cir. 2010), abrogated by Frank 
v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019) (per curiam) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2018)). 
 171. Id. at 515. 
 172. Id. at 516 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3935.04, 3935.07 (West 2019)). 
 173. Id. at 516–17. 
 174. Id. at 517 (quoting Fulfillment Servs. Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 528 F.3d 614, 
618–19 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 175. First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 564 U.S. 1018 (2011) (mem.). 
 176. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 
1219, 1219 (1993). 
 177. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536 
(2011) (No. 10-708), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
2011/10-708.pdf. Indeed, Roberts shortly thereafter provided what may be a glimpse into the 
basis for the Court’s ultimate decision to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
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Roberts thus identified a set of extraordinarily difficult procedural 
standing questions that Spokeo leaves unresolved. If a plaintiff asserts a 
procedural, statutory violation, what else (if anything) is necessary for 
standing under Article III? Roberts identifies three options: 
1) The plaintiff’s demonstration of further actual or threatened risk 
of injury-in-fact beyond the statutory violation itself; 
2) The plaintiff’s demonstration of actual injury, a showing that is 
automatically satisfied by proving the statutory violation itself, 
because Congress is entitled to conclude categorically that a risk 
of injury-in-fact arises from the statutory violation; or 
3) The plaintiff’s demonstration of only the statutory violation 
itself, because injury-in-fact is not required beyond violation of 
the procedural right that Congress has granted. 
As this Article explains, all three of the options Roberts identifies are 
valid arguments for procedural standing, depending on what category of 
right Congress intends to grant when enacting the right at issue.178 
Sometimes Congress intends that denial of the statutory intangible right or 
procedural decision-making right is itself intrinsically injurious, regardless 
of any additional injury-in-fact.179 Other times, Congress categorically 
concludes that injury-in-fact is difficult to prove and materially likely to 
arise from denial of the statutory procedural right, and thus concrete injury 
automatically arises from denial of that right.180 And still other times, 
Congress intends that injury-in-fact should be presumed likely to arise from 
denial of the statutory, procedural right, but expects the court to assess the 
particular facts of the case to determine whether that risk actually arose 
from the violation.181 
Since Spokeo, though the Court has not issued a major procedural 
standing decision, it has not been silent on the issue. Procedural standing 
played a prominent role in March 2019, when the Court went out of its way 
to signal the importance it attaches to procedural standing in Frank v. 
                                                                                                                 
granted: “[I]t seems to me that you slide back and forth between [arguments] one, two, and 
three, which makes it hard for us to get a decision.” Id. at 33. 
 178. See infra Part IV. 
 179. See infra Section IV.B. 
 180. See infra Section IV.C.1. 
 181. See infra Section IV.C.2. 
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Gaos.182 Frank sidestepped addressing the substance of a prominent dispute 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) about the propriety of cy 
pres settlements that provide no direct relief to class members. The Court 
instead raised procedural standing as a potential antecedent bar to suit, and 
by extension to judicial approval of settlement, cy pres or otherwise.  
Frank involved a class action suit alleging that Google violated the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA)183 by passing along to webpages, 
without notice or permission, a “referrer header” that included the particular 
search terms users had employed in arriving at the website.184 The question 
of procedural standing had not been raised to the Court by either party or by 
the objectors to the cy pres settlement, nor addressed by the District Court 
or the Ninth Circuit.185 The Court, however, once it recognized the vehicle 
problem of the antecedent question of jurisdiction, did not dismiss the 
petition as improvidently granted like it did in First American. This was so, 
even though the question on which certiorari had been granted turned solely 
on the propriety of the cy pres settlement.186 Instead, following the 
suggestion of the Solicitor General,187 the Court remanded to the Ninth 
Circuit “[b]ecause there remain substantial questions about whether any of 
the named plaintiffs has standing to sue in light of our decision in 
Spokeo.”188 The Court’s decision to remand on the question of procedural 
standing, unprompted by the parties and unaddressed in the lower court 
decisions, suggests that its next procedural standing decision may be in the 
offing.189 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1043–44 (2019) (per curiam). 
 183. Id. “The SCA prohibits ‘a person or entity providing an electronic communication 
service to the public’ from ‘knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents of a 
communication while in electronic storage by that service.’” Id. at 1044 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2702(a)(1)) (alterations in original). 
 184. Id. at 1044–45. The parties disputed whether the information divulged by Google 
was potentially individually identifiable; Google had argued, earlier in the case, that if the 
information was not individually identifiable, class members suffered no harm. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1044–46. 
 186. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Frank v. Gaos, 2018 WL 347810 (2018) (No. 17-
961). 
 187. See Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1045–46. 
 188. Id. at 1043–44. 
 189. Ironically, perhaps, the next such case might also involve First American, which in 
May 2019, acknowledged that its website had exposed private information from nearly a 
billion mortgage records for more than a decade. Nicole Perlroth & Stacy Cowley, Security 
Gap Leaves 885 Million Mortgage Documents Exposed, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/24/technology/data-leak-first-american.html (“First American 
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Spokeo is not merely an intellectually intriguing constitutional chestnut. 
It is emblematic of the Court’s tentative but significant steps toward 
amplifying the role of separation-of-powers principles in the October 2018 
term. If read unduly narrowly, Spokeo may serve as an imposing 
gatekeeper, employing novel separation-of-powers principles to hamper 
Congress’s ability to enact legislation that protects the rights of individuals 
from corporate defendants. 
In June 2019, in Kisor v. Wilkie, the Court narrowed Auer deference,190 
hobbling executive branch agencies’ power to interpret statutes within their 
realm of expertise.191 Chief Justice Roberts concurred on the grounds of 
stare decisis and refused to join Section III.A of the opinion,192 in which the 
four-member plurality rejected the argument that “Auer deference violates 
‘separation-of-powers principles.’”193 Kisor also suggests that a majority of 
the members of the Court are open to overturning or greatly constraining 
Chevron deference.194 
Also in June 2019, the dissenters in a fractured Court in Gundy v. United 
States signaled their willingness to sharply constrain congressional 
lawmaking power through a stringent reading of separation of powers 
principles.195 This approach would jettison more than eight decades of 
precedent under which Congress has enjoyed broad power to delegate rule-
making authority to executive branch agencies.196 Though a plurality of 
                                                                                                                 
Financial Corporation, a provider of title insurance, said Friday that it had fixed a 
vulnerability in its website that exposed 885 million records related to mortgage deals going 
back 16 years. The vulnerability would have allowed anyone to gain access to Social 
Security numbers, bank account details, drivers license and mortgage and tax records.”).  
 190. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019) (defining Auer deference as 
“defer[ing] to agencies’ reasonable readings of genuinely ambiguous regulations”). 
 191. Id. at 2418, 2423. 
 192. Id. at 2424 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part). 
 193. Id. at 2421–22. 
 194. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh, so stated in dissent in 
Kisor. Id. at 2446 n.114 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Alito and Kennedy, expressed serious reservations 
about Chevron deference as early as 2013. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 312 
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 195. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(“Working from an understanding of the Constitution at war with its text and history, the 
plurality reimagines the terms of the statute before us and insists there is nothing wrong with 
Congress handing off so much power to the Attorney General.”). 
 196. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“Congress simply 
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”); 
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four justices retained the long-standing rule, Justice Kavanaugh did not take 
part in the decision,197 and Justice Alito stated in his concurrence that “[i]f a 
majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have 
taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”198  
In dissent, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Thomas, expressed an overt desire to construe the Constitution as imposing 
strict limits on Congress’s ability to enact enforceable laws. In doing so, he 
opined that the framers 
believed the new federal government’s most dangerous power 
was the power to enact laws restricting the people’s liberty. An 
“excess of law-making” was, in their words, one of “the diseases 
to which our governments are most liable.” To address that 
tendency, the framers went to great lengths to make lawmaking 
difficult.199 
If Spokeo is read unduly narrowly as supporting this perspective, Congress 
may face difficulty in enacting legislation to protect intangible or uncertain 
injuries through instrumental rights. 
Professor Michael Herz explains that, “In Gundy, as [in Kisor, Justices] 
Kagan and Gorsuch wrote competing opinions in which the first calmly 
stood by long-standing principles and the other fulminated about a 
fundamental violation of separation of powers.”200 In cases that follow 
Spokeo, procedural standing provides another arena in which the Court may 
similarly invoke Article III to limit the power of the other branches and take 
action to protect individuals against corporate intrusion into their intangible 
interests in information, privacy, special education, and consumer rights.  
                                                                                                                 
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1944) (“Congress is not confined to that 
method of executing its policy which involves the least possible delegation of discretion to 
administrative officers.”). 
 197. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130.  
 198. Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 199. Id. at 2134 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 
48, at 309–312 (James Madison)) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James 
Madison)). As the plurality observed, “Indeed, if . . . delegation [in this case] is 
unconstitutional, then most of Government is unconstitutional—dependent as Congress is on 
the need to give discretion to executive officials to implement its programs.” Id. at 2130. 
 200. Michael Herz, Symposium: In “Gundy II,” Auer Survives by a Vote of 4.6 to 4.4, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/ 
symposium-in-gundy-ii-auer-survives-by-a-vote-of-4-6-to-4-4/. 
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Finally, in Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, the Court 
issued an almost entirely unnoticed procedural standing ruling at the end of 
its October 2018 term.201 The Court was highly flexible in finding sufficient 
evidence of risk of concrete injury—and, in turn, procedural standing—for 
a trade association of grocery retailer intervenors objecting to the disclosure 
of information under FOIA.202 The federal appellate court had specifically 
concluded that, although “releasing the contested data is likely to make 
[competitors’] statistical models marginally more accurate,” the “contested 
data . . . lacked the specificity needed [for competitors] to gain material 
insight into an individual store[],”203 but the Supreme Court ignored this 
factual finding in the course of finding sufficient concrete injury for 
standing.204 If one read Spokeo narrowly to require that harm be material to 
constitute injury-in-fact, one would be tempted to conclude that release of 
the contested data in Argus Leader was akin to an erroneous zip code—a 
technical harm, to be sure, but one specifically found to lack evidence of 
material effect, thus arguably lacking risk of real harm. Nonetheless, the 
Court found procedural standing.205 
The basis for the Court’s openness to finding risk of real harm, despite 
the court of appeals’ conclusion of no material harm, is unclear.206 The 
holding of Argus Leader, however, is best understood to reinforce the 
reading of Spokeo advanced in Section I.C.2, cabining any implications 
from Spokeo’s zip code example that might suggest that courts should 
scrutinize the extent of harm, rather than the realistic risk of harm, when 
assessing the possible real-world consequences of statutory violations. 
B. Confusion in the Courts of Appeals 
In addition to signs of continued ferment in the Supreme Court, the 
courts of appeals have been in disarray following Spokeo, with numerous 
                                                                                                                 
 201. 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2362 (2019). 
 202. Id. at 2361–62. Plaintiffs seeking information under FOIA have procedural standing 
under such cases as Akins as an instrumental intrinsically injurious right, because Congress 
has granted a statutory right to the information, which it believes generally useful, without 
the need for proof of concrete injury if the information were denied. But objectors to 
disclosure need to show risk of real harm from disclosure to show concrete injury-in-fact. 
 203. Argus Leader Media v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 889 F.3d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 2018), 
rev’d sub nom. Food Mktg., 139 S. Ct. at 2356 (emphasis added).  
 204. Food Mktg., 139 S. Ct. at 2362.  
 205. Id. 
 206. It might be indicative of the majority’s sympathy to the interests of a corporate trade 
group, as opposed to the consumers bringing suit in Spokeo and similar cases. 
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split decisions and circuit splits and no consensus about the rules that apply 
when analyzing procedural standing. Cases typically quote the set of 
general principles articulated in Spokeo—including that violation of some 
statutory procedural rights is sufficient on its own for standing, and that an 
erroneous zip code without more is an example of a bare procedural right 
insufficient for standing—then announce a result consistent with some 
subset of Spokeo’s principles without explaining the basis for choosing 
among them.207  
The cases regularly point to Spokeo’s recognition of a risk of real harm 
as the general benchmark for procedural standing, contrasting such a risk 
with bare procedural rights insufficient for standing. But the cases fail to 
elucidate several fundamental questions underlying any such criterion: 
Does the material risk test differentiate between cases in which plaintiffs 
must demonstrate additional harm beyond the statutory violation and those 
in which they do not, or is that test the means by which to measure whether 
plaintiffs have demonstrated such additional harm (or both)? To what extent 
should the court defer to congressional judgment in assessing material risk? 
Is material risk of harm assessed generally, on the basis of the statutory 
right that has allegedly been violated, or more narrowly, as a matter of the 
consequences of the violation for the particular plaintiff? Or do the answers 
to these questions change, depending on some unidentified distinction? The 
courts do not identify, let alone answer, these questions.208 
1. Collecting, Retaining, and Failing to Secure Information 
Perhaps the most notable division in the courts of appeals involves cases 
challenging statutorily prohibited collection and retention of information, 
(often followed by data breach of that information) and the resultant risk of 
identity theft. Given a defendant’s violation of a statutory obligation 
concerning privacy of information or biometric data, what more (if 
anything) must plaintiffs show to demonstrate sufficient harm, or risk of 
real harm, beyond the violation itself? Does unauthorized collection or 
retention of information cause concrete harm or risk of harm, or must some 
real risk of use or transmission of the information, or other real-world 
consequence, be shown? Does violation of a duty to secure information that 
results in data breach suffice to show concrete injury, or must some further 
evidence of identity theft, or risk of identity theft, be shown? Procedural 
                                                                                                                 
 207. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 210–13 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra Section I.B (noting an apparent (unrecognized) circuit split over whether 
a historical analog is necessary or sufficient for procedural standing). 
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standing in significant part drives the viability of lawsuits—and of class 
action settlement of such suits—in prominent cases like the Equifax data 
breach.209  
As the Fourth Circuit recognizes:  
Our sister circuits are divided on whether a plaintiff may 
establish an Article III injury-in-fact based on an increased risk 
of future identity theft. The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
have all recognized, at the pleading stage, that plaintiffs can 
establish an injury-in-fact based on this threatened injury.[210] By 
contrast, the First and Third Circuits have rejected such 
allegations.211 
The Fourth Circuit, citing to the Third Circuit’s acceptance of such an 
argument and the Seventh Circuit’s rejection, also observes that “[i]n 
Spokeo’s aftermath, some plaintiffs have attempted to establish Article III 
standing by alleging that the violation of a privacy statute, in and of itself, is 
sufficiently ‘concrete’ to establish an ‘injury-in-fact,’ to varying result.”212 
The Seventh Circuit, in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, found 
that a class of 350,000 customers had standing when they sued Neiman 
Marcus for a data breach that compromised their credit card information.213 
Plaintiffs alleged that every class member’s “personal data ha[d] already 
been stolen,” thousands of plaintiffs had already “incurred fraudulent 
charges,” and “a concrete risk of harm [exists] for the rest.”214 The court 
agreed, explaining that “it is plausible to infer that the plaintiffs have shown 
a substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus data breach. Why else 
                                                                                                                 
 209. See, e.g., Cowley, supra note 44 (describing the settlement, involving 147,000,000 
class members, that requires Equifax to pay at least $650,000,000). 
 210. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Galaria v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 387–89 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 
LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 692, 694–95 (7th Cir. 2015); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 
1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632–34 (7th 
Cir. 2007)). 
 211. Id. at 273–74 (citing Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012); Reilly 
v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40, 44 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
 212. Id. at 271 n.4 (citing In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc., 846 F.3d 625, 640–41 (3d 
Cir. 2017); Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2017)). 
 213. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690, 697. 
 214. Id. at 692. 
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would hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’ private 
information?”215 
 In contrast, a similar complaint was filed in the Fourth Circuit, though 
there was no proof that identity theft had already occurred.216 Though this 
factual difference has some relevance, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning 
contrasted sharply with that of the Seventh, going so far as to reject 
“standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm [of identity theft] will 
occur.”217 The Fourth Circuit reasoned, “[e]ven if we credit the Plaintiffs’ 
allegation that 33% of those affected by [the] data breaches will become 
victims of identity theft,”218 and even if “data breach victims are 9.5 times 
more likely [than the average person] to suffer identity theft,”219 these 
“statistic[s] fall[] far short of establishing a ‘substantial’ risk of harm.”220 It 
is difficult, however, to reconcile the Fourth Circuit’s holding that a one-
third chance of the severe consequences arising from identity theft falls “far 
short” of the risk of real harm sufficient for standing when the Supreme 
Court has held that “an identifiable trifle is enough for standing.”221 
In a trio of 2017 cases, the Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits similarly 
arrived at sharply conflicting outcomes. In direct contrast to the Fourth 
Circuit, the Third Circuit held that “violation of [plaintiffs’] statutory right 
to have their personal information secured against unauthorized disclosure 
constitutes, in and of itself, an injury in fact.”222 The majority found that 
Congress expressed concern about unauthorized disclosure of private 
                                                                                                                 
 215. Id. at 693. 
 216. Beck, 848 F.3d at 274.  
 217. Id. at 275. 
 218. Id. at 275–76. 
 219. Id. at 276 (quoting Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 533 
(D. Md. 2016)). 
 220. Id. at 276 & n.7. Beck also expressly disagreed with the Sixth and Seventh Circuit’s 
recognition of the relevance of the defendant’s offer of free credit monitoring. Id. at 276 & 
n.8. Instead, the court held that “a threatened event can be ‘reasonabl[y] likel[y]’ to occur 
but still be insufficiently ‘imminent’ to constitute an injury-in-fact.” Id. at 276 (citing 
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147–48 (2013)) (alterations in original). 
Ultimately, Beck ignored Lujan’s conclusion that procedural standing does not require a 
showing of immediacy. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7, 573 n.8 
(1992).  
 221. United States v. Students Challenging Reg. Agency Procs., 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 
(1973) (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 
601, 613 (1968)). 
 222. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc., 846 F.3d 625, 634 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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information when enacting the statutory provision at issue.223 Because 
Congress elevated this privacy concern to a legal right, the procedural 
violation was not bare and thereby constituted concrete harm, even without 
regard to any consequent risk of identity theft.224  
The Third Circuit further reasoned that the risk of future harm in the 
form of identity theft was sufficient for standing, thereby crediting as a 
material risk the allegation that “those whose personal information has been 
stolen are ‘approximately 9.5 times more likely than the general public to 
suffer identity fraud or identity theft’”—precisely the same fact that the 
Fourth Circuit rejected as immaterial.225 The Third Circuit recognized that, 
although “it is possible to read . . . Spokeo as creating a requirement that a 
plaintiff show a statutory violation has caused a ‘material risk of harm’ 
before he can bring suit, we do not believe that the Court so intended to 
change the traditional standard”—thereby expressly rejecting the Eight 
Circuit’s contrary interpretation.226 In doing so, the Third Circuit implicitly 
recognized that a risk of real harm must exist, but that a plaintiff need not 
show it, so long as Congress concluded that such risk automatically arises 
from the statutory violation. 
The Eighth Circuit found standing for one class representative (and 
therefore for the class as a whole) who alleged identity theft after a data 
breach; the court, however, rejected standing for fifteen other class 
representatives whose data had been stolen but who had not alleged they 
had already experienced identity theft.227 Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the 
D.C. Circuit mirrored the Third Circuit, finding standing for all individuals 
whose data had been stolen, based on the risk of future identity theft, and 
specifically disclaimed reliance on the two class members who alleged they 
“had already suffered identity theft as a result of the breach.”228 The court 
reasoned that “an unauthorized party has already accessed personally 
identifying data” by breaching the servers, and “it is plausible[] to infer that 
this party has both the intent and the ability to use that data for ill.”229 In 
                                                                                                                 
 223. Id. at 639. 
 224. Id. at 639 & n.19. 
 225. Id. at 634, 639 n.19 (quoting the briefs). 
 226. Id. at 637–38, 637 n.17 (footnote and citation omitted) (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016)). 
 227. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 771–74 (8th Cir. 2017).  
 228. Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 626 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 229. Id. at 628. 
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such cases, “a substantial risk of harm exists already, simply by virtue of 
the hack and the nature of the data that the plaintiffs allege was taken.”230  
The cases are fundamentally and hopelessly inconsistent on an issue 
underlying cases of immense practical importance: Does a plaintiff have 
standing to sue when her private data has been breached, in violation of a 
statutory privacy right, (1) even absent evidence that the breach has yet 
resulted in identity theft for anyone subject to that breach, given the 
heightened risk that such identity theft will occur? (2) with evidence that 
the breach has resulted in identity theft for some of those subject to the 
breach? or (3) only with evidence that the breach has resulted in identity 
theft for the plaintiff, personally? 
2. The Obligation to Notify Consumers that Disputes Must Be in Writing 
A direct circuit split also exists under a Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act (FDCPA) provision that requires debt collectors to provide consumers 
notice that their dispute of a debt must be in writing.231 The Sixth and 
Eleventh Circuits held that procedural standing exists for such violations 
because, as the Sixth Circuit explained, “[w]ithout the information about 
the in-writing requirement, Plaintiffs were placed at a materially greater 
risk of falling victim to ‘abusive debt collection practices.’”232 The Seventh 
Circuit, in contrast, expressly rejected the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion, 
holding that the failure to provide the mandated notice was insufficient for 
standing: the particular plaintiff never disputed her debt (in writing or 
otherwise), thus she was not harmed or at risk of harm from the lack of 
notice that such disputes must be in writing.233  
The Second Circuit largely sided with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits in 
Strubel v. Comenity Bank, a particularly thoughtful decision that addressed 
claims under the Truth in Lending Act.234 In Strubel, the court found 
                                                                                                                 
 230. Id. at 629. 
 231. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2018). 
 232. Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747, 756, 758 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 1692(e)) (footnote omitted); see also Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 F. 
App’x 990, 994–95 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 233. Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., Inc., 926 F.3d 329, 335–36 (7th Cir. 2019) (“It is 
not enough that the omission risked harming someone—it must have risked harm to the 
plaintiffs.”). Three Seventh Circuit judges dissented from denial of rehearing en banc. Id. at 
336 n.4. 
 234. 842 F.3d 181, 185–86 (2d Cir. 2016). The statutory protection here required 
“creditors to provide credit card holders . . . with ‘[a] statement, in a form prescribed by 
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concrete injury arising from a violation of the requirement that a lender 
provide “notice that . . . a consumer dissatisfied with a credit card purchase 
must contact the creditor in writing or electronically.”235 The court 
reasoned: 
A consumer who is not given notice of his obligations is likely 
not to satisfy them and, thereby, unwittingly to lose the very 
credit rights that the law affords him. For that reason, a creditor’s 
alleged violation of [this] notice requirement, by itself, gives rise 
to a “risk of real harm” to the consumer’s concrete interest in the 
informed use of credit.236  
Thus, the Second Circuit reasoned, “Having alleged such procedural 
violations, [the plaintiff] was not required to allege ‘any additional harm’ to 
demonstrate the concrete injury necessary for standing”—placing it in 
significant tension with the Seventh Circuit.237 The cases thus conflict on 
whether failure to comply with a consumer notice obligation that Congress 
intended to protect a class of consumers suffices for standing absent 
individualized proof that the absence of notice harmed the particular 
plaintiff. 
3. Disclosing Excessive Information on a Credit Card Receipt 
The courts of appeals are also in sharp disagreement about procedural 
standing for violations of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act 
(FACTA), an amendment to FCRA that prohibits merchants from printing 
“more than the last 5 digits of the card number or [printing] the expiration 
date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or 
transaction.”238 Most notably, the Third Circuit has recognized its direct 
conflict with the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit held that “the 
structure and purpose of FACTA show that it provides customers the right 
to enforce the nondisclosure of their untruncated credit card numbers, 
similar to the rights and harms” in common law breach of privacy and 
                                                                                                                 
regulations of the Bureau[,] of the protection provided by sections 1666 and 1666i.’” Id. at 
186 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(7)) (alterations in original). 
 235. Id. at 190. 
 236. Id. (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)). 
 237. Id. at 191 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). Casillas attempts to reconcile Strubel 
by observing that Strubel involved an open-ended credit relationship, whereas in Casillas the 
plaintiff knew she would not dispute the debt when she received the non-compliant notice of 
her rights. Casillas, 926 F.3d at 336–37. 
 238. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (2018). 
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breach of confidence torts.239 The court thus concluded that “[t]he resulting 
harm from [FACTA’s] violation is ‘concrete in the sense that it involves a 
clear de facto injury, i.e., the unlawful disclosure of legally protected 
information.’”240 
The Third Circuit expressly disagreed. Although FACTA specifically 
prohibits disclosure of credit card information on a “receipt provided to the 
cardholder at the point of the sale”—exactly what the plaintiff had 
alleged—the court found no material risk of harm in such disclosure 
because the plaintiff had not alleged the information on the receipt had been 
disclosed to any third party who might engage in identity theft.241 The 
courts thus disagreed about whether violation of a statutory right to 
information privacy granted by Congress to protect a class of consumers is 
sufficient for standing, absent evidence of a heightened risk of harm to the 
individual plaintiff. 
4. Notice About the Identity of a Creditor 
The Second and Fourth Circuits have split about the need for a plaintiff 
to prove that material harm arose from the mistaken identification of a 
creditor under similar provisions in the FCRA and the FDCPA. The Fourth 
Circuit denied standing under the FCRA for misidentification of a creditor 
because it found that the misidentification caused the plaintiff no material, 
real-world harm.242  
In contrast, the Second Circuit found standing under the FDCPA for 
“allegedly incorrect identification of . . . the creditor in the foreclosure 
complaint” because that misidentification “might have . . . pos[ed] a ‘risk of 
real harm’” to the plaintiff.243 Highlighting its divergence from the Fourth 
Circuit’s approach, the Second Circuit expressly refused to consider, as a 
matter of standing, the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff did not suffer 
any risk of concrete injury because he “failed to demonstrate any injury that 
could have possibly resulted” from the “misidentification” because it was 
                                                                                                                 
 239. Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 905 F.3d 1200, 1209–10 (11th Cir. 2018), 
vacated, 939 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 240. Id. at 1210 (quoting In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 2016)). 
 241. Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 106, 112–18 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1)). The court stated that it would not address an alternative basis for 
concrete injury held sufficient in Muransky, which had found that the burden of keeping or 
destroying the receipt to avoid having the information fall into the hands of a third party was 
a concrete injury affording standing. Id. at 118 n.10. 
 242. Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 345–46 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 243. Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki, & Assocs., P.C., 897 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2018). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
568 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:517 
 
 
“too ‘trivial’ to cause harm.”244 The court held that the materiality of harm 
arising from the misidentification was a merits issue that was irrelevant to 
standing.245 Again, the courts split on whether Congress’s grant of a 
procedural, statutory right to protect a class of consumers was sufficient to 
infer a sufficient risk of injury, or whether the plaintiff needed to 
demonstrate individualized risk of harm. 
5. Recording the Satisfaction of a Mortgage 
In an intra-circuit dispute, the Eleventh Circuit split on whether standing 
arose from a statutory, procedural requirement that mortgage satisfaction be 
timely recorded when the violation was cured before suit was filed.246 The 
majority held that because suit was brought after the mortgage satisfaction 
was recorded—albeit long after the law required that recording—the 
plaintiff no longer faced any risk of harm and thus lacked standing.247 Judge 
Martin dissented from denial of rehearing en banc, once again highlighting 
the question of whether denial of a statutory, procedural right is itself harm, 
and the extent to which courts should defer to congressional judgment 
about the likelihood of harm.248 
6. The Obligation to Provide Job Applicants a Credit Report Before 
Taking Adverse Action 
Yet another circuit split—again unnoticed by the cases themselves—has 
arisen concerning standing under an FCRA requirement that potential 
employers provide job applicants a copy of a consumer report before taking 
adverse action based on such a report.249 The Third and Seventh Circuits 
have found that standing exists when employers fail to provide reports 
before taking adverse action, reasoning that the statutory right grants the 
employee an opportunity to use the information in an attempt to influence 
the employer’s decision, regardless of whether the information is 
                                                                                                                 
 244. Id. at 82 & n.6 (quoting the brief). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Nicklaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 839 F.3d 998, 1003 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Nicklaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 855 F.3d 1265, 1272–74 (11th Cir. 2017) (Martin, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Like the FCRA, the [statute at issue here] 
required CitiMortgage to provide truthful information about him to the public. These statutes 
were crafted in response to a real risk of harm. And [the plaintiff] alleged that he suffered 
that real risk of harm as a result of CitiMortgage’s inaction that violated these statutes. In 
that way he properly alleged injury-in-fact to meet Article III standing requirements.”). 
 249. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (2018). 
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accurate.250 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has rejected standing for such a 
claim if the credit report is accurate.251 In that case, the job applicant was 
rejected because his credit report showed that he had a charged-off debt 
within the prior twenty-four months, making him ineligible for the 
defendant’s job program.252 The court held that the applicant showed no 
material risk of harm from the violation, including loss of the opportunity to 
explain to the employer that he had actually incurred the debt four years 
earlier than it was ultimately charged off and thus to argue that he fell 
outside the eligibility bar, or to argue for an exception to the bar.253 The 
court also necessarily concluded, unlike the Third and Seventh Circuits, that 
the job applicant had no right to receive his credit report and use that 
information in an attempt to influence the employer’s decision (or a 
subsequent employer’s decision) by explaining or providing context.254 
III. Understanding Procedural Standing Under Spokeo 
In light of the many circuit splits that have percolated since the Supreme 
Court decided Spokeo in 2016, the question of how one should make sense 
of procedural standing remains. The central insight is that Congress does 
not enact statutory, procedural rights that fall somewhere on a spectrum 
from no risk of harm to extremely likely harm. Further, the judicial 
assessment of procedural standing is not simply a matter of line-drawing 
between risks that are “real” and those that are “bare.”  
Instead, Congress enacts distinct categories of procedural rights, with 
each category corresponding to a distinct set of underlying legislative 
judgments and intentions, and thus implicating a distinct set of standing 
principles. Sometimes Congress enacts a statutory enforcement right, i.e., 
                                                                                                                 
 250. Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2018) (“That Robertson 
has not pleaded what she may have said if given the chance to respond [to the adverse 
information in the credit report], or that she may not have convinced Allied to honor its [job] 
offer, is immaterial to the substance of her interest in responding.”); Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. 
Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 319, 323–24 (3d Cir. 2018) (“§ 1681b(b)(3) confers on the individual a 
right to receive, before adverse action is taken, a copy of his or her consumer report 
(regardless of its accuracy) and a notice of his or her rights. This right permits individuals to 
know beforehand when their consumer reports might be used against them, and creates the 
possibility for the consumer to respond to inaccurate or negative information—either in the 
current job application process, or going forward in other job applications.”). 
 251. Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1173–76 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 252. Id. at 1170, 1176.  
 253. Id. at 1173–76. 
 254. Id. at 1175–76. 
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an overt grant of a bare right to file suit for some other injury.255 Other 
times, Congress creates a right the violation of which is intrinsically 
injurious, meaning that Congress intends that denial of the right in-and-of 
itself imposes a concrete injury.256 And still other times, Congress enacts an 
instrumental statutory right that, through a chain of causation, is intended to 
protect against the material risk of some other concrete harm with which 
Congress is ultimately concerned.257  
Spokeo specifically recognizes that “Congress has the power to define 
injuries and articulate chains of causation that . . . give rise to a case or 
controversy where none existed before.”258 Courts properly defer to the 
legislature’s judgment in exercising those powers; doing so requires courts 
to understand the different sorts of legislative judgments Congress has 
made for each category of procedural right. 
A. Spokeo Introduces a Third Strand of Procedural Standing: Instrumental 
Rights Against Private Defendants 
To understand Spokeo, it is important to look behind the Court’s 
language and identify the novel strand of rights that Spokeo introduces as 
subject to procedural standing. Spokeo does not concern itself with bare 
procedural enforcement rights that Congress has granted to authorize suit 
for an administrative agency’s alleged dereliction of its procedural, 
decision-making obligation. Instead, Spokeo introduces a third set of 
procedural rights into the procedural standing universe: instrumental rights 
against private parties.259  
                                                                                                                 
 255. E.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571–78 (1992) (holding that the 
citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), which states that 
“any person may commence a civil suit” for any violation of the Act, is a bare procedural 
right and that concrete injury must otherwise be shown). 
 256. E.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998) (holding that 
denial of information subject to mandatory disclosure under the Federal Election Campaign 
Act is intrinsically concrete injury); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 
(1989) (holding that denial of information subject to mandatory disclosure under the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act is intrinsically concrete injury). 
 257. E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007) (holding that a “litigant to 
whom Congress has ‘accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests,’” i.e., an 
instrumental right, “can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for 
redressability and immediacy”) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7). 
 258. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
 259. See id. at 1549–50. 
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In other words, what makes a statutory right “procedural” in the sense 
advanced by Spokeo is that it is instrumental, which means it is intended to 
protect some distinct interest other than the denial of the right itself. 
Congress grants instrumental rights (mandating or forbidding certain 
conduct by statute) not because of the harm caused by violation of that 
instrumental right—violation of the instrumental right itself, with nothing 
more, ordinarily causes no real-world harm—but because Congress has 
concluded that granting the instrumental right serves to protect against risk 
to a distinct, real-world, target harm. That is, the instrumental right is 
enacted for the instrumental purpose of protecting against the concrete, 
target injury. 
Lujan set the stage for instrumental rights as a distinct category, 
expressly distinguishing the bare procedural enforcement right Congress 
had enacted in that case from circumstances in which standing would exist 
when “plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the 
disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs.”260 
Lujan expressly rejected the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, which had “held 
that the injury-in-fact requirement had been satisfied by congressional 
conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental 
‘right’ to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law.”261  
Lujan thereby laid the groundwork for recognizing instrumental rights 
(expressly denominated as such) as part of the realm of procedural rights 
that afford standing when it explained “that an individual can[] enforce 
procedural rights . . . so long as the procedures in question are designed to 
protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of 
his standing.”262 Thus, Lujan appears to hold that an instrumental right—
unlike a bare enforcement right—suffices for standing because Congress 
intends for that right to protect some distinct concrete interest. It does not 
suggest any need for judicial assessment of whether the instrumental right 
in question actually provided such protection in a particular case. 
Spokeo, however, implicitly imports the concept of a “bare” procedural 
right in the form of a procedural enforcement mechanism that is untethered 
from any concrete interest, as in Lujan, and concludes that the concept 
applies—at least in some circumstances—to instrumental rights.263 Spokeo 
                                                                                                                 
 260. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517–18 
(construing an instrumental right against a public agency). 
 261. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added). 
 262. Id. at 573 n.8. 
 263. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50. 
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explains that the requirement of a concrete injury “is not automatically 
satisfied whenever a statute grants a statutory right and authorizes a person 
to sue to vindicate that right; a plaintiff may not merely allege a ‘bare 
procedural violation’ of a statute. Rather, to confer standing, the statutory 
violation must be accompanied by a concrete injury.”264  
That wording is entirely consistent with prior procedural standing cases, 
but because Spokeo involved instrumental rather than enforcement rights, 
the implication of the language is significant: instrumental rights (like 
enforcement rights) may be bare, i.e., insufficiently connected to a “risk of 
real harm” to afford standing, regardless of Congress’s intent to protect 
concrete interests.265 Spokeo also observes, however, that “the violation of a 
procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances 
to constitute injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need 
not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”266 
The central question left unresolved by Spokeo is how to harmonize the 
various principles the Court has stated regarding how a court should 
determine when the violation of a procedural right bestowed by Congress 
presents a concrete injury without evidence of additional harm: Bare 
enforcement rights never create a concrete interest that would not otherwise 
exist because Congress does not have the power to abrogate the bedrock 
concrete injury requirement of Article III. Denial of some procedural rights 
automatically establishes a concrete injury because Congress has the power 
to define intrinsically injurious rights. Denial of some instrumental rights 
automatically establishes a material risk of real harm because Congress has 
the power to articulate chains of causation connecting instrumental rights to 
a real risk of concrete injury. Denial of other instrumental rights establishes 
concrete injury, as in Spokeo, only when a violation of the right presents a 
“risk of real harm.” How are courts to reconcile these principles in a 
particular case, and in doing so, what level of deference should be accorded 
to Congress?  
  
                                                                                                                 
 264. The Supreme Court, 2015 Term, Justiciability—Class Action Standing—Spokeo, 
Inc. v. Robins, 130 HARV. L. REV. 437, 439 (2016) (footnotes omitted) (citing Spokeo, 136 
S. Ct. at 1549). 
 265. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
 266. Id. at 1549–50 (citing Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998); 
Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)). 
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B. Congress Enacts Procedural Rights for Multiple, Distinct Reasons 
Corresponding to Multiple, Distinct Categories of Procedural Standing 
Why does Congress enact procedural rights? It does so for four distinct 
reasons: (1) to authorize suit; (2) to define and thereby protect an intangible 
right; (3) to mandate a decision-making process; or (4) for the category of 
procedural rights at issue in Spokeo, to grant an instrumental right for the 
purpose of protecting a distinct, concrete interest.  
And why does Congress grant an instrumental right rather than directly 
protect the target, concrete interest? It does so for one of two reasons: 
(1) because it concludes that it may be unduly difficult to prove the 
existence or extent of injury to that target interest, or to prove the likelihood 
of risk of future injury; or (2) because it believes the instrumental right is a 
necessary and proper means of prophylactically preventing members of a 
group from suffering the target injury, rather than simply affording 
compensation for the subset of group members who file suit and are able to 
prove the target injury has occurred.267 
The first of Congress’s four reasons for enacting procedural rights is that 
it sometimes wishes to create an enforcement right, i.e., to grant a private 
cause of action to enforce some other right. When that other right is also 
procedural, as under Lujan, standing turns on whether that other right 
affords standing by implicating a particularized and concrete injury.268 
Second, Congress sometimes enacts a right that, though intangible, is 
granted for its own sake—i.e., though it may not be obvious, the intangible 
right is what would traditionally be understood as a substantive right. It is 
not, at least primarily, intended to be instrumentally useful in protecting 
some other right. Instead, it is granted for its own sake, given congressional 
judgment that violation of the right itself intrinsically constitutes real-world, 
concrete injury.  
Third, Congress sometimes enacts a right that requires a defendant—an 
executive agency or, post-Spokeo, a private party—to engage in a specified 
decision-making process before it acts.269 In some sense, Congress is 
motivated by the belief that a better process is likely to result in a 
substantively wiser eventual decision. But Congress also grants such 
                                                                                                                 
 267. See id. at 1549–50; cf. Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 128, at 59. 
 268. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1992). 
 269. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348–50 
(1989) (considering injury from violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
which requires agencies to draft Environmental Impact Statements). 
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procedural, decision-making rights because those rights are valuable, in and 
of themselves. Congress grants those with a concrete interest in the subject 
matter of the decision a right to attempt to influence the decision-making 
process, or to have the decision-maker consider specified factors before 
making the decision.270 Denial of the mandated process thus creates an 
injury that is not contingent on the likelihood that a valid process would 
result in a more favorable decision.271 
And finally, as with the rights at issue in Spokeo, Congress sometimes 
enacts an instrumental right. That is, Congress enacts instrumental rights 
mandating or forbidding particular conduct not because that conduct is 
intrinsically harmful, but because Congress believes protecting the 
instrumental right is necessary and proper to further protect a distinct, real-
world interest. 
With such instrumental rights, Congress enacts the instrumental right 
rather than direct protection of the target right because it has made a 
categorical judgment that the target harm or risk of harm to members of the 
protected group is some combination of likely, difficult to prove, or 
prophylactically useful in avoiding the target harm. Based on this 
congressional judgment, the violation of such an instrumental right should 
result in an automatic judicial finding of real-world harm to the target 
interest.272 
With other instrumental rights, Congress believes such real-world harm 
may well occur as a result of a violation of the instrumental right, but it has 
not made that categorical judgment, and it does not intend for that 
conclusion to be automatic for a reviewing court. Such a conclusion is only 
presumptive, and a reviewing court must determine whether the particular 
plaintiff was harmed or subjected to a risk of real harm by violation of such 
instrumental rights.273 
C. Judicial Deference to Congressional Judgment 
When Congress makes legislative judgments in the course of enacting 
procedural rights, courts should defer to those judgments in determining 
standing. Courts should not defer blindly but should recognize 
congressional power to define injuries for intrinsically injurious rights, and 
to articulate chains of causation between instrumental rights and the 
                                                                                                                 
 270. See id. at 350 n.13. 
 271. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 & n.7. 
 272. See infra Section IV.C.1.  
 273. See infra Section IV.C.2. 
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concrete, target harms they are intended to prevent.274 “[E]valuating the 
gravity of injury and its connection to statutory violation involves both 
findings of legislative fact, at which Congress is more adept than courts, 
and determining the desirability of value-laden trade-offs, which must rely 
on the democratic accountability of Congress.”275 
Historically, the judiciary has so deferred. “When a plaintiff relies on a 
statute as the basis for its standing claim, the Court has consistently 
resolved the standing issue in accordance with its interpretation of 
congressional intent.”276 As the Court has recognized: 
The nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate 
forum for the determination of complex factual questions of the 
kind so often involved in constitutional adjudication. Courts, 
therefore, will overturn a legislative determination of a factual 
question only if the legislature’s finding is so clearly wrong that 
it may be characterized as “arbitrary,” “irrational,” or 
“unreasonable.” Limitations stemming from the nature of the 
judicial process, however, have no application to Congress.277 
                                                                                                                 
 274. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Congress has the power to 
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy 
where none existed before.”) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment)). 
 275. Mark Seidenfeld & Allie Akre, Standing in the Wake of Statutes, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 
745, 752 (2015); see also William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247, 279–80 (2001) (“From a comparative institutional analysis 
perspective, courts are simply unsuited to evaluate independently either general legislative 
judgments about statutory goals and process or the significance of particular legal breaches 
and associated litigation.”). 
 276. Pierce, supra note 17, at 1192 (citing Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 
347 (1984); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372–79 (1982); Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 75–77 (1978); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208–11 (1972); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 
150, 153–58 (1970); FCC v. Sander Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476–77 (1940)); see 
also Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and 
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 637–38 (1999) (“[As to] information, and perhaps more 
generally, the Court has rooted the standing question firmly in Congress’s instructions. 
Whether a plaintiff has standing depends on what the relevant statute says. For . . . ‘injury in 
fact’ . . . the foundation for the Court’s conclusion is that Congress created a legally 
cognizable injury and gave citizens the right to redress that injury in court.”). 
 277. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247–48 (1970) (citation omitted) (citing 
Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 94–95 
(1961); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–54 (1938); Metro. Cas. Ins. 
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Judicial respect for the separation of powers, and for the legislature’s 
power to make law and to determine complex factual questions, includes 
respecting Congress’s judgment underlying the procedural rights it enacts. 
Thus, when Congress makes a judgment that a right is intrinsically 
injurious, such that its violation constitutes injury in fact, that judgment 
should be respected. Moreover, when Congress articulates a chain of 
causation between an instrumental right and the target right it is intended to 
protect, courts should defer to that congressional judgment, whether it is 
categorical or presumptive. 
IV. The Categories of Statutory, Procedural Rights 
Recall that Chief Justice Roberts, at oral argument for First American, 
asked plaintiff’s counsel to clarify his argument concerning injury-in-fact. 
He highlighted three possible arguments: (1) that there was an injury in fact 
in the case, (2) Congress’s creation of the statute should be construed as a 
presumption of injury in fact, or (3) an injury in fact is not required and the 
procedural violation alone is sufficient.278 
The answer to which of the three arguments is correct is: It depends, 
because determination of injury-in-fact depends on the category of 
procedural right Congress intended to enact. Congress sometimes intends to 
enact intangible statutory rights for which injury-in-fact beyond the 
statutory violation is not required; sometimes, it intends to enact 
instrumental rights for which injury-in-fact is to be automatically presumed; 
and sometimes, it intends to enact instrumental rights for which material 
risk of injury-in-fact is presumptively present, but must be demonstrated in 
each particular case. 
When Congress enacts a procedural statutory right, it does not have a 
monolithic intent to enact a single type of statutory right. Not all procedural 
rights are subject to a single, over-arching test for procedural standing 
which courts use to divide statutory rights into two piles, bare rights and 
rights involving at least a risk of real harm.279 Instead, Congress enacts 
                                                                                                                 
Co. of N.Y. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 583–84 (1935)); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) (plurality) (“[C]ourts must accord substantial deference to 
the predictive judgments of Congress.”). 
 278. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 177, at 32. 
 279. See Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747, 756 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Spokeo 
categorized statutory violations as falling into two broad categories: (1) where the violation 
of a procedural right granted by statute is sufficient in and of itself to constitute concrete 
injury in fact because Congress conferred the procedural right to protect a plaintiff’s 
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procedural rights that fit into distinct categories, each with a different nexus 
between the procedural right and the concrete interest with which Congress 
is ultimately concerned. Congress enacts procedural rights for distinct 
reasons—and with different intended connections between the statutory 
provision and the concrete harm that Congress ultimately wishes to protect. 
In order to protect the separation of powers between the branches, the 
judicial branch must actually consider the particular nature of the power 
that Congress intended to exercise and defer to “Congress[’s] . . . power to 
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that . . . give rise to a case 
or controversy where none existed before.”280  
This recognition leads to a fundamental principle of procedural standing: 
When a court assesses the existence of procedural standing, its task is not to 
engage in some over-arching, trans-procedural assessment of concrete 
injury, risk of real harm, bareness of procedure, or any additional facts 
concerning concrete harm alleged beyond the statutory violation itself. The 
first step in analyzing procedural standing requires the court to determine 
the category of procedural right that Congress intended to enact. The 
second step requires the court to determine, deferentially, whether 
Congress’s judgment reflected in that decision is so arbitrary, irrational, or 
unreasonable that it must be rejected. Procedural standing is warranted 
unless Congress intended to direct the court to issue an advisory opinion, 
enforce a generalized right to proper administration of the law, or enforce 
an instrumental procedural right that (at the time of violation) had no 
material connection to any risk of actual, concrete harm. 
On, then, to a typology of procedural rights. Statutory procedural rights 
fall into three categories: enforcement, intrinsically injurious, and 
instrumental. The first category—enforcement rights—is straightforward: it 
includes provisions in which Congress expressly provides a cause of action, 
stating that a claim may be brought. These rights are procedural in the sense 
that they relate to the conduct of litigation rather than regulating real-world 
conduct. 
The second category—intrinsically injurious rights—includes those 
intangible rights the denial of which Congress in and of itself intends to 
                                                                                                                 
concrete interests and the procedural violation presents a material risk of real harm to that 
concrete interest; and (2) where there is a ‘bare’ procedural violation that does not meet this 
standard, in which case a plaintiff must allege ‘additional harm beyond the one Congress has 
identified.’”) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)). 
 280. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
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constitute injury-in-fact; the right is not aimed at protection of some other, 
ultimate harm. In contrast, the third category—instrumental rights—are 
those rights Congress enacts to protect some other distinct target interest 
that would likely be materially affected by a violation, rather than Congress 
being concerned with violation of the instrumental right in and of itself. 
Spokeo brings these instrumental rights into the procedural standing 
pantheon, as against private parties. 
A crucial, practical dividing line exists between those procedural rights 
that do not require a plaintiff to demonstrate some additional harm or risk 
of real harm beyond denial of the statutory right itself and those that do. All 
intrinsically injurious rights fit into the former category, as one may 
imagine—whether that right is intangible or is a decision-making or 
dignitary right like that at issue in Lujan.  
Not so obviously, but of vital importance, one sub-type of instrumental 
rights also fits into this category. Such rights, which this Article terms 
instrumental automatically injurious rights, are those rights that Congress 
enacts for the purpose of preventing some distinct target harm, intending 
that a statutory violation automatically result in standing.281 Congress 
intends this outcome because it concluded that a violation of the 
instrumental right in question categorically results in a chain of causation 
that gives rise to a risk of real harm to the protected class that would be 
difficult to prove.  
Another sub-type of instrumental rights is instrumental presumptively 
injurious rights.282 For these rights, Congress presumes that standing is 
appropriate but intends for courts to exercise judicial scrutiny to determine 
whether the statutory violation resulted in a risk of the real harm with which 
Congress was ultimately concerned for the particular plaintiff.283  
A. Enforcement Rights 
The first category of procedural rights is enforcement rights. These are 
the traditional “bare” procedural rights, or procedural rights “in vacuo,” 
recognized in Lujan and Spokeo.284 Because this category of procedural 
                                                                                                                 
 281. See infra Section IV.C.1. 
 282. See infra Section IV.C.2. 
 283. Such harm or risk of harm is often an element of the violation itself, but even if it is 
not, it remains a matter of procedural standing. 
 284. See, e.g., Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545 (quoting the enforcement right for willful 
violation of the FCRA); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–72 (quoting “[t]he so-called ‘citizen-suit’” 
provision of the Endangered Species Act as the enforcement right). 
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right only represents congressional intent to afford a cause of action for 
enforcing some other right (in the context of procedural standing, some 
other procedural right) it cannot itself confer standing, absent a risk of 
concrete injury from denial of that other right. 
But the existence of such an enforcement right is still relevant, 
notwithstanding its inability to confer standing. Congress’s decision to 
grant such an enforcement right demonstrates its belief that standing is 
proper. That belief, while not dispositive, tilts the scale toward a finding 
that standing is proper when courts afford deference to this congressional 
intent while conducting the standing analysis.285 
B. Intrinsically Injurious Rights 
The second category of procedural rights is intrinsically injurious rights, 
i.e., those rights that, when denied, automatically result in concrete injury 
(and thus standing). The two sub-types are intrinsically injurious intangible 
rights, i.e., rights that in and of themselves provide a benefit that is 
concrete, though intangible, and intrinsically injurious decision-making or 
dignitary rights, i.e., rights that provide a remedy for harm resulting from 
denial of an entitlement to participation in and opportunity to attempt to 
influence a decision-making process.  
1. Intrinsically Injurious Intangible Rights 
The first sub-type of intrinsically injurious right is intrinsically injurious 
intangible rights, which are intangible rights granted for their own sake 
because the denial of such rights constitutes concrete injury. Because 
Congress has, in these instances, created a legal right the denial of which in 
and of itself constitutes injury, evidence of additional harm is not only 
unnecessary but also irrelevant.286  
It is useful to recognize that these rights, while intangible, are not really 
procedural in any meaningful sense. They are raised here because Spokeo’s 
discussion of standing blurs the distinction between procedural and 
                                                                                                                 
 285. The existence of an enforcement right to sue must be distinguished from the 
ultimate legal viability of the claim. The existence of a sufficient “legal interest” as a 
threshold matter of standing is limited to determining if the federal “claim is wholly 
insubstantial and frivolous.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946); see also Oneida 
Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Cty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974) (holding that 
standing is precluded only if a claim is “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior 
decisions of [the Supreme] Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve 
a federal controversy”). 
 286. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
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intangible rights when it begins its discussion of procedural standing by 
pointing to free speech and free exercise rights as “intangible injuries [that] 
can nevertheless be concrete.”287 Moreover, courts of appeals consistently 
analyze the existence of standing for such rights by applying Spokeo, 
without appreciating the distinction between intrinsically and 
instrumentally injurious rights.288 
There is also a practical reason for discussing this category of rights in 
the course of delineating procedural standing: It is not always obvious 
whether Congress intended a right to be intrinsically or instrumentally 
injurious.289 Thus, drawing lines between intangible intrinsically injurious 
rights and instrumental rights is necessary, and accurate line-drawing 
requires an understanding of what lies on either side. 
Spokeo recognizes this category when it quotes Lujan’s observation that 
“Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries 
concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.’”290 In 
other words, this category covers interests that are already (intrinsically) 
concrete, prior to and independent of Congress’s decision to statutorily 
grant a right protecting that interest; Congress has simply created a legal 
right, defining what would already be a de facto injury as a legal injury. But 
sometimes, if there would otherwise be doubt as to whether an injury is 
concrete, Congress’s power to exercise its judgment in defining the injury 
as a legal right warrants judicial deference. 
                                                                                                                 
 287. Id. 
 288. Cf. Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724, 727 n.2 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(concluding that the characterization of a right as substantive or procedural is irrelevant 
under Spokeo because both require injury-in-fact—though not recognizing that a statutory 
violation can be intrinsically injurious and thereby constitute injury-in-fact). 
 289. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19–20 (1998) (exemplifying 
the difficulty in distinguishing whether a right is intrinsically or instrumentally injurious due 
to the lack of clarity about Congress’s intent in granting the statutory right to receive the 
information at issue). Congress might plausibly have granted the right at issue: (1) because 
the information was itself intrinsically valuable, (2) because Congress concluded the 
information would as a general matter be instrumentally useful to the class of recipients 
statutorily entitled to that information, who could reasonably be expected to use it to further 
the distinct, concrete interests in lobbying and in influencing elections, or (3) because 
Congress thought the information likely instrumentally useful to each recipient (thus 
requiring each recipient to prove that its denial as to them would cause a risk of harm). Id. 
Spokeo rejected the third possibility and suggested the second to be correct. Spokeo, 136 S. 
Ct. at 1549. 
 290. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 
(1992)). 
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Intrinsically injurious intangible rights parallel common law rights, such 
as trespass and breach of contract, for which violation of the right is itself 
injurious. A plaintiff can bring suit for trespass or breach of contract and 
recover nominal damages, even absent any proof, evidence, or possibility of 
concrete harm arising from the violation.291 Courts have been in widespread 
agreement—applying the rubric of Spokeo—that unsolicited telemarketing, 
in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TPCA),292 
affords procedural standing, even absent any proof of harm beyond the fact 
that an unauthorized call, fax or text was placed.293 
The TCPA makes it unlawful “for any person within the United 
States . . . to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other 
device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited 
advertisement.”294 The Ninth Circuit held that the TCPA conferred standing 
to sue when a plaintiff received an unsolicited text message 
advertisement.295 The court pointed to the history of “[a]ctions to 
remedy . . . invasions of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, and nuisance” 
and congressional findings that unwelcome telemarketing can invade 
privacy.296 As the court explained, “Unsolicited telemarketing phone calls 
or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude 
of their recipients. A plaintiff alleging a violation under the TCPA ‘need 
not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.’”297 
                                                                                                                 
 291. See Hessick, supra note 32, at 281–86; 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 56, at 149 (2d ed. 2011) (trespass actionable for nominal damages, even absent injury); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (nominal damages 
for breach of contract); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §1 
cmt. a, § 3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (restitution is permissible in the absence of, or 
beyond the scope of, provable loss). 
 292. 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-73). 
 293. See, e.g., Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1042–43 (9th 
Cir. 2017). 
 294. 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(1)(C). 
 295. Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1042–43. 
 296. Id. at 1043. 
 297. Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)); accord Melito v. 
Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 88–95 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that standing exists 
for TCPA claim alleging unsolicited text messages); Krakauer v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 925 
F.3d 643, 649–54 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding the sales agents calls were equivalent to 
unsolicited phone calls); Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348–51 (3d Cir. 
2017) (same as to single unsolicited phone call); see also Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 
136 S. Ct. 663, 669–72 (2016) (finding a TCPA class action justiciable, four months before 
Spokeo). 
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In other words, the receipt of an unsolicited advertisement via telephone, 
fax machine, computer, or cellphone is intrinsically injurious; no further 
harm or risk of harm need be shown. 
Some courts have also found violation of rights that prohibit the 
collection or dissemination of private information to be intrinsically 
injurious, looking to both history and congressional intent to determine that 
the legislatively forbidden intrusion was itself injurious, regardless of any 
additional risk or loss.298 History is particularly relevant in determining the 
existence of an intrinsically injurious intangible right because the existence 
of a historical analog, either common-law or statutory, that was regularly 
brought without evidence of harm beyond the violation itself provides 
compelling evidence that Congress intended for a similar right to be 
considered intrinsically injurious. 
2. Intrinsically Injurious Decision-Making and Dignitary Rights 
The second sub-type of intrinsically injurious rights is intrinsically 
injurious decision-making and dignitary rights, which are the sort of rights 
at issue imposed on agencies in traditional procedural standing cases.299 
One form of such rights is when Congress mandates that an agency or a 
private defendant employ a particular decision-making process, e.g., that it 
must decide particular issues when a triggering event occurs, or that it must 
consider certain data or issue a report on particular issues before making a 
decision. Another form is when Congress mandates that those with a 
                                                                                                                 
 298. See, e.g., Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that disclosure of personal identity and viewing history under Video Privacy 
Protection Act was concrete injury, even absent “additional consequences”); Heglund v. 
Aitkin Cty., 871 F.3d 572, 577–78 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that unlawful accessing of 
private driver’s license information under Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, affording 
standing, regardless of further harm, because it was not a bare procedural violation under 
Spokeo); In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d 262, 271–74 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that Viacom’s 
and Google’s collection and disclosure of internet users’ personal information, such as 
websites visited and videos viewed, afforded standing, given “Congress’s judgment [that the 
information] ought to remain private,” and that “Spokeo . . . does not alter our prior analysis 
in Google”); In re Google, Inc., 806 F.3d 125, 133–35 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that 
placement of cookies on users’ computers violated various state and federal statutes, 
including the Stored Communications Act, giving rise to standing even if the users had not 
suffered any resulting economic loss). 
 299. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007) (“[A] litigant to whom 
Congress has ‘accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests’ . . . ‘can assert 
that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.’”) 
(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 n.7 (1992)).  
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concrete interest in the outcome of a decision be afforded an opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making process. Such participatory rights are 
granted because of the dignitary value thereby provided, guaranteeing 
access and an opportunity to attempt to influence the ultimate decision, 
regardless of any evidence providing a basis to believe that the interested 
party’s participation is likely to alter that decision. 
When Congress grants such decision-making rights, part of its 
motivation is a general desire to advance the substantive wisdom of the 
ultimate decision to be made. But part of the motivation is also to create a 
fair process, independent of the outcome. Congress thus employs the 
mechanism of granting those with a personal interest in the outcome of the 
decision an enforceable right to insist that the defendant employ the 
required decision-making process, without requiring proof that compliance 
with that process would have resulted in a different, more favorable 
outcome. Similarly, when Congress grants a participatory right to someone 
with a concrete stake—a guaranteed opportunity to influence a decision by 
participating in the process—denial of the mandated process necessarily 
causes injury to the party in question, without proof or evidence that the 
exclusion caused additional harm by altering the decision that would have 
been made.300 
These decision-making rights include the procedural rights discussed in 
cases like Lujan: obligations on agencies to issue a decision in defined 
circumstances, or to consider particular evidence in reaching a decision.301 
They include agency obligations, under statutes like NEPA, to issue an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before making a decision 
constituting a “major Federal action.”302 The agency is substantively free to 
take any action, regardless of any environmental impact it recognizes in the 
EIS, but the failure to issue an EIS bars the agency from taking action.303 
As Justice Scalia explained in Lujan, plaintiffs who are geographically 
proximate to areas affected by an environmental decision who have been 
denied such a decision-making right need not prove that, if they had been 
afforded the right, the ultimate decision would have been different or the 
potential consequence imminent; rather, denial of the decision-making right 
                                                                                                                 
 300. See Lee & Ellis, supra note 19, at 174 n.21 (explaining that with decision-making 
rights, “the plaintiff is entitled to the process whether or not it will make any difference in 
the real world”); accord Burt, supra note 9, at 295–97. 
 301. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568–70. 
 302. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 336 (1989). 
 303. Id.  
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is itself enough to afford standing, regardless of any additional risk of 
harm.304 As the Court recognized as early as 1997, “It is rudimentary 
administrative law that discretion as to the substance of the ultimate 
decision does not confer discretion to ignore the required procedures of 
decisionmaking.”305 
This sub-type of rights parallels the Supreme Court’s recognition of the 
intrinsic value of procedural due process. The Court held in Carey v. Piphus 
that suit may be brought and nominal damages recovered for violation of 
the procedural due process right to pre-deprivation notice and a hearing, 
even if it is proven that provision of such a process would not have changed 
the resulting decision.306 The Carey Court declined to authorize actual 
damages for a public school’s denial of plaintiff’s participatory decision-
making right absent proof that the mandated process would have changed 
the outcome of the decision or that emotional damages arose from the 
denial.307 But the Court permitted recovery of nominal damages, even 
without proof of such additional harm—thus necessarily, if implicitly, 
finding standing to bring suit—because denial of the mandated process was 
itself an injury-in-fact.308 
This type of dignitary, decision-making right also helps explain the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of standing in cases challenging affirmative 
action in contracting and university admissions. The Court has held that 
being subject to an unfair decision-making process affords standing, even if 
it is proven that the proper process would not have altered the decision: 
“The injury in cases of this kind is that a ‘discriminatory classification 
prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing.’ The aggrieved 
party ‘need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the 
barrier in order to establish standing.’”309  
Whatever one thinks of the Court’s solicitude for the dignitary injuries of 
white plaintiffs challenging affirmative action policies in programs for 
which they had no chance of admission even absent affirmative action, the 
principle is the same as that at issue in procedural standing: Certain 
                                                                                                                 
 304. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7, 573 n.8. 
 305. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 172 (1997). 
 306. 435 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1978). 
 307. Id. at 259–64. 
 308. Id. at 266–67. 
 309. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 
656, 666–67 (1993)). 
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decision-making rights are so fundamental that their denial works a 
dignitary injury, regardless of additional harm. 
Intrinsically injurious decision-making and participatory rights exist 
when a procedure itself constitutes the guaranteed right that Congress 
intends to protect. Just as procedural due process guarantees notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, regardless of whether the plaintiff can prove any 
possibility of a different result if such procedural rights were provided, 
these rights reflect the value and importance of a fair process, independent 
of the substantive outcome. Such rights include the guarantee of an 
opportunity to attempt to convince a decision-maker—a core procedural 
value—through a combination of a dignitary right in the person and the 
institutional integrity of the decision-making entity. 
The determination of whether a procedural right is an intrinsically 
injurious decision-making or dignitary right, as opposed to an instrumental 
right focused on the potential effect on the outcome of the decision, is 
analogous to the determination of structural error at trial. For intrinsically 
injurious rights, the nature of the flaw is sufficiently serious that any 
asserted harmless error is either unduly difficult to determine or irrelevant 
given the gravity of the denial. Overwhelming evidence of a criminal 
defendant’s guilt can never justify the denial of a jury, or the use of a jury 
that was selected through a racially biased process.310 But a right’s 
relationship to a decision-making process does not necessarily make it 
intrinsically injurious; the question is whether Congress intended to confer 
the sort of decision-making, participatory, or dignitary right such that the 
denial itself causes injury. 
Spokeo’s extension of procedural standing to claims against private 
parties strongly suggests that when Congress has enacted a statutory 
obligation that fundamentally constrains a private party’s decision-making 
process, the same principles applicable to an agency’s decision-making 
obligations also apply. When a plaintiff alleges that a private party has 
failed to comply with a mandated decision-making process, or to afford 
interested plaintiffs a right of participation that respects their dignity and 
provides them an opportunity to attempt to influence the decision, that 
violation is itself sufficient for standing: The plaintiff need not prove that 
compliance with the decision-making obligation would have been likely to 
change the decision. 
                                                                                                                 
 310. In contrast, the denial of an instrumental presumptively injurious right is precisely 
of the sort subject to harmless error analysis. See infra Section IV.C.2. 
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Courts and scholars have frequently noted the existence of such 
dignitary, procedural rights concerning decision-making processes. As 
Professor Robert Bone has noted, “[S]ome scholars argue that a right to 
participate is required to respect the dignity of those who are bound or 
otherwise seriously affected by a decision.”311 Respect for the dignity of 
those deeply affected by a substantive decision justifies, for example, the 
rights of absent class members. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) 
grants an absolute right of notice and participation to absent class members 
in a class proceeding that will bind them as to individualized damages, 
regardless of whether there is any reason to believe that such a right is 
pragmatically useful, or even when such a right is harmful to the interests of 
those absent class members.312 Such rights are justified because 
“participation in regulatory problem solving by interested and affected 
parties has an independent, democratic value.”313 
Professor William Buzbee argues that at least some of these constraints 
on agency decision-making should be understood as substantive rather than 
procedural violations, thus justifying standing.314 In arguing that the denial 
is substantive, what he apparently means is that the violation is intrinsically 
injurious, regardless of proof of additional harm; the distinction is largely 
semantic, but the argument he makes, echoed in this Article, is that some 
intrinsically injurious rights arise from mandated decision-making 
procedures. The essential point is that certain decision-making rights, often 
labeled procedural because they concern the decision-making process, are 
                                                                                                                 
 311. Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1027 
(2010) (citing JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158–253 
(1985)). 
 312. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option for Class Actions, 115 
MICH. L. REV. 171, 183–84 (2016).  
 313. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 27 (1997). Similarly, Professor Solum points to a model of procedural justice that 
“connects the independent value of process with the dignity of those who are affected by 
legal proceedings. . . . This right to participation is justified by a background right of 
political morality, that is, the right of persons . . . to be treated with dignity and respect.” 
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 262–63 & n.208 (2004) 
(footnote omitted); see also id. at 259 & n.201 (“The participation model holds that 
procedural fairness requires that those affected by a decision have the option to participate in 
the process by which the decision is made.”). 
 314. William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and 
Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 793 n.148 
(1997). 
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so fundamental that their denial itself creates an injury-in-fact, regardless of 
any effect on the resulting decision.315 
Perhaps best exemplifying this category of rights is the circuit split as to 
standing under the FCRA for an employer’s failure to provide job 
applicants with a copy of a consumer report before taking adverse action 
based on that report.316 The Third and Seventh Circuits, which found 
standing based on the applicant’s guaranteed procedural right to use the 
report to have an opportunity to influence the employer’s decision317 have 
the better of the arguments here. The right at issue is an intrinsically 
injurious decision-making right guaranteeing participation in the decision-
making process and access to information to craft an argument in an 
attempt to influence the employer’s decision, without any need for proof of 
likely success. As the Seventh Circuit explained, “Article III’s strictures are 
met not only when a plaintiff complains of being deprived of some benefit, 
but also when a plaintiff complains that she was deprived of a chance to 
obtain a benefit.”318 
                                                                                                                 
 315. See Sunstein, What’s Standing, supra note 17, at 203. “Procedural fairness . . . is not 
subsumed completely by substantive justice. Procedural fairness means that a legitimate 
decisionmaking process promotes independent values of participation, deliberation, and 
consensus.” Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 1413, 1489 (1991) (“The decisionmaking enterprise can be empowering where it gives 
participants a stake in the outcome because it promotes both a sense of collective 
responsibility for the outcome and an individual opportunity to succeed a fair proportion of 
the time.”). Thus, “[i]f process is constitutionally valued . . . it must be valued not only as a 
means to some independent end, but for its intrinsic characteristics: being heard is part of 
what it means to be a person. Process itself, therefore, becomes substantive.” Laurence H. 
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 
1063, 1070–71 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
 316. See supra Section II.B.6. 
 317. See Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 695–97 (7th Cir. 2018); Long v. 
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 321–23 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 318. Robertson, 902 F.3d at 697 (citing Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 
973, 983 (2017); Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)). The Ninth Circuit decision rejecting standing on this claim seems 
particularly misguided; the information in that particular credit report was technically 
accurate, but the plaintiff had an entirely reasonable explanation for why it was not as 
troubling as it seemed, in that the potentially concerning conduct of not paying a debt had 
occurred four years earlier than the report implied; thus the legislative purpose would have 
been particularly well-served by affording the employee an opportunity to explain why the 
debt should not have been disqualifying. See Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 
F.3d 1166, 1173–75 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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C. Instrumental Procedural Rights 
The third category of procedural rights—instrumental rights, including 
those against private parties—were referenced in Lujan and overtly 
incorporated into the procedural standing universe in Spokeo. An 
instrumental right is one that Congress enacts for the purpose of protecting 
against some other distinct harm, rather than for its own sake; the 
instrumental right is granted only because of the risk of harm its denial 
presents to the distinct (concrete) target harm that Congress is actually 
intending to prevent.  
For example, the obligation to provide notice of some other right or duty 
is always instrumental; Congress is not directly concerned with the act of 
notice itself, but notice serves to protect the other right or duty about which 
Congress is ultimately concerned. Also instrumental is the right at issue in 
Spokeo, credit reporting agencies’ obligation to employ reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information in 
credit reports. Consumers do not have a concrete interest in credit reporting 
agency’s procedures in and of themselves; nor do they have a concrete 
interest in agencies’ following the law, and Congress had no reason to 
confer such a right for its own sake. Instead, Congress believed the 
obligation to have reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible 
accuracy to be instrumentally useful to protect consumers against the 
distinct, concrete injury of errors in credit reports that posed a risk of real-
world harm.319 
1. Instrumental Automatically Injurious Rights 
The first sub-type of instrumental right is the instrumental automatically 
injurious right. These rights, though instrumental, are intended by Congress 
to automatically confer standing whenever they are denied. The rights 
themselves are not intrinsically injurious; no concrete harm arises directly 
from their denial. Rather, Congress has concluded that a violation of the 
instrumental right creates a categorical, material risk of harm to the 
concrete, target right with which Congress is ultimately concerned. That 
categorical risk of harm to the class of people protected by the right, at the 
time of violation, justifies automatically conferring standing for a violation 
of the instrumental right. 
These rights (along with intrinsically injurious rights) are within the 
category Spokeo refers to when it states that “the violation of a procedural 
                                                                                                                 
 319. See infra Section IV.C.2. 
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right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to 
constitute injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not 
allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”320 If 
Congress intends for the violation of an instrumental right to automatically 
establish standing, based on the categorical risk of a difficult-to-prove real 
harm that it determined was materially likely to arise from the statutory 
violation, then the court’s task is simply to assess the propriety of that 
conclusion, with due deference to Congress.  
This category parallels the common law torts of libel and slander per se. 
As Spokeo observes, “[T]he law has long permitted recovery by certain tort 
victims even if their harms may be difficult to prove or measure.”321 Unlike 
trespass or breach of contract, the violation itself does not cause intrinsic 
injury; rather, the general difficulty of proving and measuring the harm that 
is likely to arise from the violation justifies recovery (and thus, plainly, 
authorizes suit), even absent evidence of such harm or risk of harm in a 
particular case. 
As Spokeo explains, “Just as the common law permitted suit in such 
instances, the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be 
sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. . . . [A] 
plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one 
Congress has identified.”322 For example, Spokeo explains, Congress 
decided that it was useful to enact rights to receive information in various 
statutes that Spokeo specifically denominates as “procedural”; these rights 
require that, in defined circumstances, certain information be provided 
because Congress has concluded that such information is useful to the class 
of people who are statutorily entitled to receive it.323 Spokeo continues, the 
                                                                                                                 
 320. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549–50 (2016) (citing Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 
440, 449 (1989)). 
 321. Id. at 1549 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 569, 570 (AM. LAW INST. 
1938) (libel and slander per se, respectively)). 
 322. Id. at 1549–50 (citing Akins, 524 U.S. at 20–25; Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449). 
 323. Akins involved mandated provision of information under the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971, and Public Citizen under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Id. at 
1549–50. Though the Court did not mention it, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is 
similar: someone entitled to information under FOIA need not prove concrete injury arising 
from denial of the information sought; Congress has concluded that the information is 
sufficiently likely to be useful that its denial automatically presents a material risk of harm. 
Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449 (“As when an agency denies requests for information under the 
Freedom of Information Act, refusal to permit appellants to scrutinize the ABA Committee's 
 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
590 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:517 
 
 
“‘inability to obtain information’ that Congress had decided to make public 
is a sufficient injury in fact to satisfy Article III,” without any need for the 
plaintiff to prove that denial of the information caused any further injury.324  
Again, Congress has not concluded that the information is of intrinsic 
value to everyone; instead, it enacts the instrumental right to access the 
information in order to further the distinct interest in recipients’ use of the 
information to “participate more effectively in the judicial selection 
process,”325 or “to evaluate candidates for public office.”326 Impairment of 
the target interest is the concrete injury. But Congress has enacted the 
instrumental right and made the judgment that denial of that instrumental 
rights suffices for standing.  
As the Court explained in Public Citizen, when an agency refuses to 
provide information that must be disclosed under FOIA, that denial 
“constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue,” and 
plaintiffs need not “show more than that they sought and were denied 
specific agency records.”327 History and congressional judgment thus show 
that it is permissible for Congress to enact an instrumental right that 
automatically confers standing when violated, if Congress determines that a 
material risk of harm arises from that violation; Article III does not mandate 
that each plaintiff be able to prove that the harm or risk of harm to the target 
interest actually manifested itself.328 
                                                                                                                 
activities to the extent FACA allows constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide 
standing to sue.”). 
 324. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50 (discussing Akins). 
 325. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449. 
 326. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21. 
 327. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449. A similar principle applies with copyright. “Even for 
uninjurious and unprofitable invasions of copyright the court may, if it deems it just, impose 
a liability within statutory limits to sanction and vindicate the statutory policy.” F.W. 
Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952). 
 328. Even as to instrumental automatically injurious rights, courts properly deny standing 
if, at the time of violation, the circumstances are such that it was impossible for the 
procedural right to be of benefit to the plaintiff, i.e., that the plaintiff was not in the class of 
people Congress intended to protect by enacting the statutory right. For example, as the 
Second Circuit held in Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 191–92 (2d Cir. 2016), 
standing does not exist for failure to provide notice of a right concerning a service the 
defendant did not offer and which there was no plausible basis to believe it might later offer. 
The question is whether, affording deference to congressional judgment, there was a material 
risk of harm that arose from the violation. If the defendant did not offer a service, or the 
plaintiff was definitively ineligible for the service, then there is no risk of real harm. 
Congress’s judgment covers the likely consequences of the statutory violation for those who 
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2. Instrumental Presumptively Injurious Rights 
The next sub-type of instrumental right is the instrumental presumptively 
injurious right. For such rights, Congress has concluded that a violation of 
the instrumental right has a material possibly of resulting in harm to a 
distinct, concrete interest, but it does not intend for that judgment to be 
categorical such that violation of the instrumental right is itself 
automatically sufficient to confer standing. Instead, Congress has concluded 
that a violation of the instrumental right will often—and in the ordinary 
case does—cause harm or a material risk of harm to the target interest, but 
the difficulties of proof and risk of harm are not so great as to warrant 
automatic standing from denial of the statutory right alone.329  
For these rights, a court properly considers not only violation of the 
instrumental statutory right, but also whether the facts at issue suggest a 
past, present, or future harm or risk of harm to the target concrete interest 
with which Congress is ultimately concerned. Of vital importance is that 
assessment of the risk of real harm is satisfied if that risk existed at any 
point—most notably, if risk of harm existed at the time of the violation, 
thereby ensuring that the procedural right is not bare or in vacuo, i.e., with 
no meaningful risk that it will materialize into a real-world harm.330  
Congress has the power to enact procedural, instrumental rights it 
considers necessary and proper to protect against material risk of concrete 
injury. As the historical examples of libel, slander, unjust enrichment, and 
intellectual property demonstrate, Article III standing requires no more than 
that the plaintiff face a material risk of concrete injury arising from 
violation of the procedural right that Congress has granted. Judicial 
judgment about the existence of material risk—either automatic or 
                                                                                                                 
might conceivably be subject to the target injury, at the time of violation; Congress made no 
judgment warranting deference about whether a defendant offered or a plaintiff was eligible 
for a particular service. 
 329. Often, with presumptively injurious rights, Congress will confer the enforcement 
right to sue only on those who are harmed or “aggrieved” by violation of the instrumental 
right. In such cases, “statutory standing” is coextensive with Article III standing. 
 330. See, e.g., Strubel, 842 F.3d at 189 (“[T]o determine whether a procedural violation 
manifests injury in fact, a court properly considers whether Congress conferred the 
procedural right in order to protect an individual’s concrete interests. ‘[D]eprivation of a 
procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—a 
procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III standing.’”) (quoting Summers 
v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009)); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 
1548–50 (2016) (“This does not mean, however, that the risk of real harm cannot satisfy the 
requirement of concreteness.”). 
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presumptive—is guided by deference to congressional judgment about the 
“chains of causation”331 between violations of the instrumental right and the 
target harm.  
For instrumental automatically injurious rights, Congress intends for 
courts to hear cases based on the statutory violation alone. The judicial role 
in assessing standing is to review, deferentially, Congress’s judgment that a 
risk of injury to the ultimate concrete interest generally arises, at the time 
that the instrumental right is violated, to those granted a right to sue, and 
that difficulties of proof justify automatic standing. For instrumental 
presumptively injurious rights, in contrast, Congress intends for courts to 
consider the facts of the actual case to see if the particular circumstances 
show that the violation resulted in harm or risk of real harm, at the time of 
violation (or thereafter). 
Most obviously within this presumptively injurious category is the 
violation in Spokeo itself: the duty for credit reporting agencies to “follow 
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” of consumer 
reports.332 This mandate is instrumental because Congress is not concerned 
with—and did not intend to grant consumers a right to challenge—credit 
reporting agencies’ abstract, sub-standard procedures.333 It intended to enact 
an instrumental presumptively injurious right that would reserve to a 
reviewing court the question whether the procedural shortcoming that 
would ordinarily result in a meaningful error in a credit report actually gave 
rise to a risk of real harm in the particular case or, instead, if the violation 
was so trivial that, without evidence of any further risk of harm beyond the 
violation itself, no harm or risk of real harm arose.334  
D. Substance Versus Procedure Is Not a Meaningful Categorical 
Distinction 
It is worth noting that it is fruitless to analyze the existence of procedural 
standing—or statutory standing, intangible standing, or whatever else one 
might label the questions of standing implicated by Lujan and Spokeo—by 
                                                                                                                 
 331. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50. 
 332. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2018). 
 333. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545, 1550 (“On the one hand, Congress plainly sought to 
curb the dissemination of false information by adopting procedures designed to decrease that 
risk. On the other hand, Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a bare 
procedural violation.”). 
 334. See id. at 1550 (“A violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may 
result in no harm.”). 
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distinguishing statutory rights that are substantive as opposed to those that 
are procedural. As the Court has explained, “[T]he words ‘substantive’ and 
‘procedural’ themselves . . . do not have a precise content, even (indeed 
especially) as their usage has evolved.”335 “Except at the extremes, the 
terms ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ precisely describe very little except a 
dichotomy, and what they mean in a particular context is largely determined 
by the purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn.”336 
Some observations can be made from the Court’s general unwillingness 
to place weight on the traditional understanding of “substance” and 
“procedure.” First, enforcement rights are plainly procedural in the 
paradigmatic sense that they govern adjudication rather than real-world 
conduct (though, of course, the existence of a right to sue influences the 
behavior of those subject to suit). Second, intrinsically injurious intangible 
rights are plausibly substantive, in a traditional sense, because they grant a 
real-world right, the denial of which causes real-world injury (though, of 
course, the granting of such a right is in some sense procedural in that it 
enables one to file suit to adjudicate denial of that right).337 
Intrinsically injurious decision-making and dignitary rights are a mixed 
bag. Previous commentators often, understandably, characterized them as 
procedural in that the obligation is to employ a particular procedure.338 
                                                                                                                 
 335. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727 (1988). 
 336. Id. at 726; accord Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (“[W]e are 
loath to enter the logical morass of distinguishing between substantive and procedural 
rules.”); Buzbee, supra note 275, at 255 n.33 (“The line between substantive and procedural 
agency errors is unclear.”). See generally D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and 
“Procedure” Revisited with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of 
“Irrebuttable Presumptions,” 30 UCLA L. REV. 189 (1982) (documenting widespread 
confusion about the distinction). 
 337. Solum, supra note 313, at 205 (“A rule is procedural if its function is to regulate 
adjudication-related conduct. A rule is substantive if its function is to regulate conduct that 
occurs outside the context of adjudication.”). 
 338. See Burt, supra note 9, at 276 (“A procedural injury occurs when an agency fails to 
follow a legally required procedure, such as the preparation of an EIS, and this failure 
increases the risk of future harm to some party.”); Brian J. Gatchel, Informational and 
Procedural Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75, 
77 n.6 (1995) (“Procedural standing is standing to ensure that a governmental agency 
follows proper procedure as set out in a particular statute.”) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 (1992)); Lee & Ellis, supra note 19, at 174 n.21 (“By 
‘procedural rights,’ we refer (as Justice Scalia did in his Lujan footnote seven) to those rights 
affirmatively conferred by statute or regulation. Procedural rights are entitlements to process 
that may be divorced from any underlying ‘real-world’ desiderata . . . .”). 
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More comprehensively, the medium is sometimes the message;339 here, the 
procedural right is sometimes the substance in the sense that the denial of 
the procedural right is itself a concrete injury. 
Finally, instrumental rights are neither fish nor fowl. Nothing is gained 
by trying to characterize them as one or the other, or as some particular 
chimera. Perhaps instrumental presumptively injurious rights might in some 
ways lean more toward the procedural side of the ledger, whereas 
instrumental automatically injurious rights are another thoroughly mixed 
bag.340 The label applied, however, is not what matters. Instead, courts 
should focus on questions such as whether the statutory violation itself 
suffices for standing, without evidence of risk of additional harm, or if such 
risk must be shown in the particular case. 
V. Spokeo’s Answers, and Answers to Spokeo’s Questions 
Spokeo thus establishes several new principles: 
$ Statutory rights as against private parties require not only 
particularized injury but also concrete injury to afford standing; 
$ Instrumental statutory rights—procedural rights conferred to 
further a distinct, concrete interest—are subject to procedural 
standing analysis; 
$ “Bare” procedural rights insufficient for standing no longer refer 
solely to enforcement rights with no connection to concrete 
injury—instrumental rights are also bare if not connected to 
concrete injury or risk of real harm; 
$ Concrete injury is established by real-world harm or risk of real 
harm; 
                                                                                                                 
 339. Cf. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING THE MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 
7–35 (1964). 
 340. See, e.g., Curtis v. Propel Prop. Tax Funding, LLC, 915 F.3d 234, 240–43 (4th Cir. 
2019) (characterizing as “substantive” a statutory right prohibiting credit transactions that 
require consumers to pre-authorize repayment by electronic fund transfer). The right is best 
thought of as an instrumental right, one the court properly recognized as automatically 
injurious, given the congressional conclusion that pre-authorization presented a categorical 
risk of real harm to consumers from the creditor’s exercise of that right. 
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$ In some circumstances, statutory, procedural violations 
presenting a risk of real harm do not require proof of additional 
concrete injury beyond the statutory violation itself; 
$ History is instructive about standing, thus courts should consider 
whether an intangible right has a close relationship to a harm 
traditionally regarded as providing a basis for suit; and 
$ Congressional judgment is important and instructive about 
procedural standing, because Congress is well-positioned to 
identify intangible harms that satisfy Article III, and given 
Congress’s power to define injuries and articulate chains of 
causation to create standing that would not otherwise exist. 
Spokeo and its progeny, however, leave several further questions unclear: 
$ How should risk of real harm be assessed: by evaluating the risk 
generally posed by violation of the statutory right in question, or 
by considering the risk of real harm to a particular plaintiff? 
$ When the risk of real harm is assessed by considering the risk to 
a particular plaintiff, does standing exist if risk of real harm was 
present at the time of violation but dissipated prior to suit? 
$ When courts consider whether the procedural right at issue has a 
close relationship to a historical analog affording standing, is the 
existence of the analog necessary for standing, or is it simply 
sufficient? 
$ When should courts defer to congressional judgment in defining 
injuries sufficient for standing? 
$ When should courts defer to congressional judgment about the 
chain of causation between an instrumental right and the risk of 
real harm the instrumental right is intended to prevent? 
$ How broadly should courts determine the concrete interest 
Congress intends to further through an instrumental right—does 
it turn on a statute’s overall purpose, or on the interest furthered 
by the particular instrumental right at issue? 
$ What are the steps of judicial review over questions of 
procedural standing? 
Observations about each of these loose ends follow. Most importantly, 
much of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding procedural standing can 
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be eliminated by recognizing the different categories of procedural rights 
that Congress intends to enact, as enumerated in Part IV.  
When Congress intends to enact an intrinsically injurious right, courts 
should defer to congressional power to define injuries and thereby create 
standing where none existed before. That is true for both intrinsically 
injurious intangible rights and for intrinsically injurious decision-making 
and dignitary rights. For all such intrinsically injurious rights, a plaintiff 
need not show additional harm or risk of harm beyond violation of the 
statutory right. 
When Congress intends to enact an instrumental right, courts should 
defer to congressional power to find chains of causation between the 
instrumental right and the ultimate, real-world target interest with which 
Congress is ultimately concerned.  
When that instrumental right is an instrumental automatically injurious 
right, Congress has determined that a real risk of concrete harm 
categorically arises to the group protected by the statute as a general matter 
from the statutory violation, but has determined that the harm or risk of 
harm may be difficult to prove. Thus no additional harm or risk of harm 
beyond the statutory violation need be shown. For such rights, the court’s 
role is to review—deferentially—Congress’s judgment about the general 
chain of causation between the instrumental right and the target, real-world 
interest Congress intended to further. And when determining that real-world 
interest, courts should consider the real-world interest furthered by the 
particular statutory right or rights at issue in the case—informed by, but not 
limited to, the overarching purpose of the statute as a whole.341 
When that instrumental right is an instrumental presumptively injurious 
right, Congress has determined that a risk of real harm is likely to exist as a 
consequence of the statutory violation, but it has not determined that the 
risk arises categorically for every member of the group protected by the 
statute. Instead, Congress intends for the court to assess not only the 
existence of the statutory violation, but also the existence of additional 
harm or risk of real harm to the particular plaintiff under the facts of the 
case. This determination should be made with due deference to Congress’s 
determination of policy judgments and likely factual chains of causation in 
                                                                                                                 
 341. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (2019) (“[R]easonable 
statutory interpretation must account for both the specific context in which . . . language is 
used and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Grp. 
v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014)). 
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the face of uncertainty, but the facts of the particular case may override 
such determinations or otherwise conflict with that congressional judgment.  
When a court assesses whether a statutory violation resulted in harm or 
risk of real harm to a particular plaintiff, that assessment should encompass 
risk of real harm that existed at the time of the violation. In other words, for 
standing to exist, if actual harm has not been shown, the statutory violation 
must have placed the plaintiff at risk of real harm—but that risk need not 
continue indefinitely or even be in existence at the time of suit. As under 
the common law, risk of real harm is sufficient for standing, even when, at 
the time of suit, it turns out that there is no evidence of actual harm beyond 
the statutory violation.342 For instrumental automatically injurious rights, 
violation of the instrumental right must generally give rise to a sufficient 
risk of harm. For instrumental presumptively injurious rights, the particular 
plaintiff must generally have been exposed to a risk of real harm; exposure 
to that actual, real-world risk of harm is sufficient for standing, regardless 
of whether that risk later dissipates. 
As to the role of history, neither the language nor the reasoning of 
Spokeo suggests that a historical analog is necessary for standing; they 
simply suggest that it is sufficient. Spokeo refers to “historical practice” as 
“instructive,” language it would not have used if it meant to convey that an 
analog is necessary.343 Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan, 
which was both necessary for the fifth vote in Lujan and was embraced in 
Spokeo, explains that “[a]s Government programs and policies become 
more complex and farreaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of 
new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law 
tradition.”344 That admonition is well taken. Courts should be sensitive to 
congressional judgment about new rights of action that are necessary and 
proper to protect against risk of real-world harm, even if that protection is 
indirect and instrumental. 
VI. Problem Cases Revisited 
Finally, it is useful to briefly revisit some cases raised earlier that seemed 
to present intractably perplexing issues of procedural standing. Applying 
                                                                                                                 
 342. See supra notes 115, 320–28 and accompanying text. 
 343. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
 344. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
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the approach described above greatly simplifies the analysis of standing in 
these cases. 
First, consider special education claims on behalf of educationally 
disabled children under the IDEA. Plaintiffs bringing these claims face 
what appears to be a formidable standing hurdle in that the vast majority of 
the IDEA’s protections are procedural, dictating the process by which an 
Individualized Education Plan (IEP) should be created, rather than the 
substantive propriety of the IEP that results. If a school district fails to 
follow one of the IDEA’s procedural mandates, does procedural standing 
require that the child prove the existence of additional, concrete harm 
beyond the procedural statutory violation itself? And how would the child 
prove, for example, that a failure to include a special education teacher on 
the team drafting the IEP, or to include the child’s parents as members of 
the IEP team, caused the child concrete, real-world injury?  
The answer is that these IDEA procedural obligations are intrinsically 
injurious decision-making and dignitary rights; for purposes of standing, 
there is no need to demonstrate the practical consequences of a government 
actor’s failure to comply with its decision-making obligations.345 For such 
decision-making rights, as the Supreme Court has explained with regard to 
a failure to draft an Environmental Impact Statement, a plaintiff “who 
alleges a deprivation of a procedural protection to which he is entitled never 
has to prove that if he had received the procedure the substantive result 
would have been altered. All that is necessary is to show that the procedural 
step was connected to the substantive result.”346 
Next, consider Frank v. Gaos, the case involving a cy pres settlement in 
which the Supreme Court remanded for an assessment of procedural 
standing.347 With the benefit of the framework developed above, this case is 
also relatively straightforward: On the plaintiff’s version of the facts (which 
should be taken as true for purposes of finding standing sufficient to permit 
                                                                                                                 
 345. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007). Some of the IDEA’s 
less-fundamental procedural obligations, not relating directly to the IEP formation process, 
such as the requirement that certain waivers be in a signed writing, are likely instrumental 
rights, intended to further the concrete right to knowing and voluntary waiver of that right 
(and ultimately to the provision of a free and appropriate public education). But for such 
rights, liability under the IDEA for the procedural violation requires that the right to a free 
and appropriate education be impeded, so procedural standing imposes no additional barrier 
to suit. See generally Romberg, supra note 48. 
 346. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518 (quoting Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. 
v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
 347. 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1046 (2019). 
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approval of the class action settlement), Google had relayed individualized, 
stored electronic information about the search terms consumers used to 
reach a website.348 Setting aside the merits question of whether the statute 
prohibited such conduct—an issue not relevant to standing—the violation 
asserted is of an intrinsically injurious intangible right to informational 
privacy. Thus, plaintiffs need not demonstrate additional harm or risk of 
harm arising from unauthorized transmission of their private information in 
order to have standing to assert their claim. 
And what of Spokeo itself, and the claim that Spokeo had failed to 
employ reasonable procedures designed to assure maximum possible 
accuracy in credit reports, resulting in substantial errors in Robins’ credit 
report? First, Spokeo quite reasonably (if implicitly) determined that 
Congress intended to enact an instrumental right rather than an intrinsically 
injurious intangible or decision-making right. Congress did not intend for a 
credit reporting agency’s use of a sub-optimal procedure, in connection 
with the creation of an individual’s credit report, to itself constitute concrete 
injury to the individual. Most notably, if a credit reporting agency used lax 
procedures to gather information but the resulting credit report was 
nonetheless entirely accurate, Congress did not intend for the statute to have 
been violated. Instead, Congress intended for the procedural obligation to 
be instrumental, i.e., it imposed the obligation on credit reporting agencies 
to follow procedures designed to assure maximum possible accuracy so as 
to protect consumers from the distinct, real-world harm of erroneous credit 
reports resulting from inadequate procedures. 
Further, Spokeo implicitly concludes (reasonably enough) that Congress 
did not intend to enact an instrumental automatically injurious right; 
Congress did not believe that credit reporting agencies’ failure to follow 
reasonable procedures justifies an automatic assumption of resulting real-
world injury.349 A credit report created with sub-optimal procedures does 
not necessarily result in error, let alone any real-world risk of harm. This 
conclusion is entirely plausible, both because sub-optimal procedures do 
not so regularly lead to error such that a court should automatically find 
injury from the procedural shortcoming, and, even more importantly, 
because resulting error in the credit report is not hard to determine or prove. 
It is simple for an individual to demonstrate the existence and nature of any 
errors in a resulting credit report; thus, there is no reasonable basis to 
                                                                                                                 
 348. Id. at 1044–45. 
 349. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549–50 (2016). 
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believe Congress intended for concrete injury to automatically arise from 
inadequate procedures. Instead, Spokeo understood that Congress presumed 
concrete injury would likely arise from the failure to follow reasonable 
procedures assuring maximum possible accuracy, but intended to require 
the particular consumer to show some additional real-world risk of injury.  
Finally, and less obviously, Spokeo’s zip code example, discussed in 
dicta, is best understood to suggest that the Court did not consider a 
perfectly accurate credit report to be the real-world, target harm with which 
Congress was ultimately concerned. Instead, Congress was concerned with 
the real-world harm that might well arise from inaccurate credit reports. I 
determined that sub-optimal procedures would likely result in erroneous 
credit reports, and that credit reports containing such errors would, in turn, 
likely have the potential to result in real-world harm. But Congress did not 
believe these chains of causation to be automatic; Congress anticipated that 
consumers would need to demonstrate further risk of harm beyond the 
statutory, procedural violation itself. 
This understanding explains the Court’s statement that “[i]t is difficult to 
imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, 
could work any concrete harm.”350 Setting aside the infelicity of the chosen 
example, what the Court meant was that the FCRA did not impose a 
statutory obligation on credit reporting agencies to employ reasonable 
procedures for the purpose of protecting a consumer’s target interest in a 
perfectly accurate credit report, free of meaningless, technical errors. 
Congress meant instead to protect consumers against some risk of real-
world harm arising from errors in credit reports caused by sub-optimal 
procedures. 
Conclusion 
Spokeo portrays itself as a modest case that establishes no new law, 
simply remanding for the Ninth Circuit to apply the second half of an 
injury-in-fact test that it had improperly ignored: the existence of not only 
particularized but also concrete injury-in-fact. In actuality, Spokeo’s opaque 
summary of procedural standing, and the confounding examples it provides, 
have given rise to widespread uncertainty and confusion in the courts of 
appeals and have left unanswered multiple, fundamental questions about 
when statutory, procedural injuries afford standing absent evidence of 
additional risk of harm. 
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This Article has attempted to explain Spokeo’s sub silentio introduction 
of instrumental rights as against private parties into the procedural standing 
universe; how such instrumental rights fit into the various categories of 
statutory, procedural rights that Congress enacts; and how the congressional 
intent underlying each of those categories maps onto the requirements of 
procedural standing applicable to each category. Properly understood, 
procedural standing is neither toothless nor a fearsome gatekeeper.  
There are two further reasons why Spokeo may not unduly constrain 
congressional power. First, at least given the current membership of the 
Supreme Court, Justice Thomas and the four liberal justices will likely 
provide five votes to read procedural standing in a broader way than other 
separation-of-powers issues that come before the Court.  
And, more importantly in the long run, if Congress is more careful and 
overt about its intent when enacting instrumental rights, courts both 
should—and as a practical matter, are more likely to—defer to such 
legislative determinations. Specifically, when enacting a procedural right, 
Congress should overtly state the following: (1) the group and the target 
right it intends to protect; (2) any causal chain it has concluded connects an 
instrumental right to a target injury; and, perhaps most importantly, (3) the 
category of procedural right it intends to enact, thereby making plain what 
further harm or risk of harm, if any, it expects the plaintiff to demonstrate in 
order to have standing. Such clarity will result in a better balance between 
the legislative and judicial powers, while best promoting separation of those 
powers without infringement by either branch. 
Congress cannot direct the courts to violate Article III’s case or 
controversy requirement by purporting to grant a plaintiff standing to 
enforce a bare procedural right not actually designed to protect that 
plaintiff’s concrete interests. Congress, however, has the power to define 
rights that afford standing without the need for evidence of further harm. 
And Congress has the power to articulate chains of causation, concluding 
that risk of real harm arises from violation of an instrumental right. And 
those are judgments to which the judiciary properly defers. 
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